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Resumen en Castellano
En mi tesis doctoral, se desarrollan modelos de dinámica de rmas para estudiar
los determinantes de la integración vertical dentro y entre industrias, el efecto de
políticas que dependen del tamaño de las rmas, y el impacto de la regulación dual
en el mercado de trabajo sobre la productividad agregada y la distribución de rmas.
En el primer capítulo, Outsourcing versus Vertical Integration: A Dy-
namic Model of Industry Equilibrium, se desarrolla un modelo estocástico
de una industria con empresas heterogéneas que interactúan como compradoras y
vendedoras de insumos en un contexto con fricciones de mercado las cuales inducen
un problema de "hold-up" a los productores de bienes nales. El modelo gen-
era un comportamiento consistente con nuevos hechos empíricos sobre integración
vertical los cuales indican que las empresas verticalmente integradas son más pro-
ductivas, más grandes y están formadas por las mejores empresas productoras de
insumos (en términos de tamaño y productividad). En este contexto, la estructura
vertical de una industria emerge como resultado de decisiones optimas de inver-
sión bajo incertidumbre. Las rmas eligen entre integrarse verticalmente, invertir
en establecer relaciones con proveedores de insumos especializados o simplemente
comprar insumos estandarizados. Dicho marco teórico provee un contexto natural
para abordar diversas cuestiones relevantes: Porque las relaciones verticales varían
entre industrias así como entre rmas dentro de cada industria? Porque no todas
las empresas grandes se integran verticalmente? Cuáles son los efectos de cambios
en las propiedades del proceso estocástico que gobierna los shocks a nivel rma so-
bre la estructura vertical de una industria? Encontramos que mayor incertidumbre
está asociada con mayor probabilidad de tercerización de la producción de insumos;
rmas verticalmente integradas son más grandes y más ecientes; rmas produc-
toras del bien nal que son idénticas en tamaño pueden diferir en su estructura
vertical; e idénticas rmas verticalmente integradas pueden evolucionar diferencial-
mente (desintegrarse o permanecer integradas). También se analizan los efectos
que cambios en los costos de integrarse tienen sobre el bienestar, y la producción y
productividad agregada.
En el segundo capítulo, Dual Employment Protection Legislation and
the Size Distribution of Firms (con Andrés Erosa), se desarrolla un modelo
de dinámica de rmas con fricciones de búsqueda y costos de despido asimétricos
para los trabajadores temporarios y permanentes (legislación dual de la protección
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en el mercado laboral). Se caracteriza la composición de equilibrio de rmas con
diferente crecimiento de productividad a lo largo de su ciclo de vida, y se estudian los
efectos de la legislación dual sobre la distribución de tamaño y productividad de las
rmas. Los resultados indican que un mayor costos de despido para los trabajadores
permanentes juega un rol similar al de un impuesto sobre las empresas grandes y un
subsidio sobre las empresas chicas (similar efecto al de políticas que dependen del
tamaño de las rmas, "size-dependent policies") distorsionando la selección de rmas
y la asignación de recursos entre rmas. De esta manera cambios en la regulación
del mercado de trabajo que inducen un mayor empleo de trabajadores temporales
genera una caída en la productividad total de los factores. Consistentemente con
la evidencia presentada en el actual trabajo de investigación, a pesar de observar
similares niveles de productividad por tamaño de rma, países con legislación dual en
el mercado de trabajo que incentivan el uso de contratos temporales presentan una
mayor fracción de rmas pequeñas (que concentran a su vez una mayor proporción
del empleo total) y menor productividad agregada. En este sentido, el modelo brinda
una nueva perspectiva sobre los determinantes de las diferencias en la distribución
del tamaño de rmas entre países.
En el tercer capítulo, Size-Dependent Policies and Vertical Integration,
motivado por evidencia empírica reciente que indica que los países en desarrollo
tienen menos rmas verticalmente integradas y que dichas rmas son más produc-
tivas y grandes, se desarrolla un modelo dinámico con rmas heterogéneas que in-
teractúan como compradoras y vendedoras de insumos, con decisiones endógenas de
integración vertical, y fricciones de mercado. En este modelo la estructura vertical
de las rmas resulta de decisiones óptimas de inversión bajo incertidumbre. Luego
se calibra el modelo a la industria manufacturera de Estados Unidos para cuan-
ticar el impacto de políticas tamaño dependientes ("size-dependent policies") en
la asignación de recursos entre rmas determinando diferencias en la productividad
agregada. Dichas políticas son modeladas como impuestos sobre la producción y el
empleo de mano de obra que las rmas con escala por encima de un cierto nivel
deben pagar. Las distorsiones sobre el nivel de producción y empleo generan una
reasignación de recursos (trabajadores) desde rmas grandes a rmas pequeñas y
actúan como una barrera a la integración vertical. Los resultados indican que un
impuesto del 5% a la producción sobre rmas con productividad por encima de la
media genera una caída en la fracción de rmas verticalmente integradas desde un
8.7% a un 7%, una caída de la productividad agregada del 2.9%, y un incremento del
11% en el tamaño medio de las rmas. Un impuesto al empleo de mano de obra del
15% genera una caída en la fracción de rmas verticalmente integradas desde 8.6%
a 7.1%, una caída de la productividad agregada del 2.4% y una caída del tamaño
medio de rma del 1.2%.
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Dissertation Abstract
In my thesis, "Essays on Firm Dynamics", I develop di¤erent models of
rm heterogeneity and rm dynamics to investigate the determinants of vertical
integration across industries and across rms within industries, as well as the impact
of size-dependent policies and dual employment protection legislation on the size
distribution of rms and aggregate productivity
In the rst chapter, Outsourcing versus Vertical Integration: A Dy-
namic Model of Industry Equilibrium, motivated by the empirical fact that
vertically integrated producers are more productive, bigger and are matched to bet-
ter suppliers (with high productivity and size), I develop a dynamic stochastic model
of an industry with heterogeneous rms interacting as buyers and sellers, and mar-
ket frictions that induce a hold-up problem to the manufacturers to account for
these facts. In the model economy, an industrial structure emerges as the result of
optimal investment decisions that rms undertake under uncertainty. Firms choose
whether to integrate, link to external sellers or buy inputs in the market. This
theoretical environment provides a natural framework to answer several questions:
Why do supply relations vary across industries and across rms within industries?
Why arent all large rms vertically integrated? How do changes in the proper-
ties of uncertainty at rm level determine di¤erences in the vertical structure of
an industry? We nd that higher uncertainty is associated with higher likelihood
of outsourcing; vertically integrated rms are larger and more e¢ cient; otherwise
identical downstream rms may di¤er in their vertical structure, and those that are
vertically integrated can end up disintegrated or remain integrated. We also analyze
the e¤ects of changes in costs of vertical integration and outsourcing on welfare,
aggregate output and productivity.
In the second chapter, Dual Employment Protection Legislation and the
Size Distribution of Firms, (joint paper with Andrés Erosa), we develop a the-
oretical model of rm dynamics with search frictions and asymmetric ring costs
for temporary and permanent workers (dual employment protection legislation). We
characterize the equilibrium labor composition that rms with di¤erent productivity
growth rate choose over their life cycle, and we study the e¤ect of dual employment
protection legislation on the distribution of rmssize and productivity. The results
indicate that high relative ring costs for permanent workers play similar role as a
tax to big rms and a subsidy to small rms (size-dependent-policies) by distorting
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rm selection as well as the allocation of resources across rms. Therefore, changes
in the regulation that induce a higher use of temporary workers generate a decline
in the level of TFP. Consistent with the evidence also documented in this paper, in
spite of having similar labor productivity by rmssize-classes, countries with dual
employment protection legislation that incentives or extend the use of temporary
contracts have relatively smaller rms (that concentrate a higher fraction of employ-
ment), and lower aggregate productivity. In this sense the model gives new insights
into the sources of the considerable di¤erences in the rm-size distributions across
countries.
In the third chapter, Size-Dependent Policies and Vertical Integration,
motivated by the fact that developing countries have fewer vertically integrated rms
than more developed countries; and vertically integrated rms are more productive
and bigger, I develop a dynamic model of an industry with heterogeneous rms
interacting as buyers and sellers of inputs, endogenous vertical integration, and
market frictions. In the model economy, the vertical industrial structure emerges
endogenously as the result of optimal investment decisions that rms undertake. I
calibrate the model to the US economy to quantify the impact of size-dependent
policies on the reallocation of resources across rms determining di¤erences in total
factor productivity. Size-dependent policies are modeled as taxes on output or labor
costs that establishments above a certain size have to pay. Distortions on production
and employment generate a reallocation of resources (employment) from big rms to
small rms and act as barriers to vertical integration. I nd that a 15% output tax
on rms that are above mean level of productivity generates a decline in the fraction
of vertically integrated rms from 8.7% to 7%, a decrease in TFP of 2.9%, and an
increase of 11% in the mean size of rms. A 15% tax on employment generates a
decline in the fraction of vertically integrated rms from 8.6% to 7.1%, a decrease
in TFP of 2.4% and a decline of 1.2% in the mean size of rms.
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Chapter 1
Outsourcing versus Vertical Integration: A Dynamic Model
of Industry Equilibrium
1.1 Introduction
The organization of economic activity has been a eld of extensive research in eco-
nomics. This literature, which goes back to the seminal paper by Coase (1937), has
focused on the scope of the market versus the rm. Since then, important contribu-
tions on transaction cost economics and contract theory have been emphasizing the
role of transaction costs, asset specicity, supply uncertainty, incomplete contract-
ing, market power and regulation on vertical integration.1 These models, however
are silent about rm dynamics. This is in contrast with new evidence, by Hortaçsu
and Syverson (2009), which shows that there is a close relationship between the
vertical structure of rms and key determinants (size and productivity) of the dy-
namic behavior of producers. In particular, vertically integrated producers are more
productive, bigger and are matched to better suppliers (with high productivity and
size). Similarly, there is a large empirical and theoretical literature on rm dynam-
ics studying size distribution of rms, turnover, mobility and productivity, among
1The literature, at the broadest level, has considered the following perspectives on vertical integration:
agency theory articles include Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmstrom (1982); transaction costs theory
research includes Williamson (1979); and the references for the property right theory are Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). Gibbons (2005) provides a summary and a comparison of
these theories. The most recent surveys include Joskow (2005) and Lafontaine and Slade (2007). Recent
theoretical and empirical research on the study of the determinants and e¤ects of vertical integration within
and across industries include McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2002), Antras (2003), Acemoglu
et al. (2004) and (2005), Novak and Stern (2007a,b), Ciliberto and Panzar (2009), Legros and Newman
(2009) and Gibbons, Holden and Powell (2010).
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other issues.2 ;3 Given the lack of data, however, this literature has abstracted from
the vertical relations rms optimally choose. This is the gap the current model tries
to ll.
Introducing endogenous vertical structure decisions (i.e. vertical integration ver-
sus outsourcing) into industry equilibrium has implications for key variables of in-
terest, such as size distributions, turnover, etc. For example, vertical integration
(we refer to it as VI), in contrast with outsourcing, allows rms to avoid hold-up
problems, transactions costs, and cost uctuations; and insure specialized input
procurement, but also increases managerial costs. Thus, di¤erences in costs and
benets in VI across industries may have an impact on rmsprotability and sur-
vival, determining di¤erences in size distribution of rms and average productivity
of an industry.
This paper builds a long-run dynamic entry and exit equilibrium model of het-
erogeneous upstream (suppliers) and downstream (manufacturers) rms and market
frictions that induce a hold-up problem to the manufacturers. Firms choose whether
to integrate, link to external sellers or buy inputs in the market. An industrial
structure is the result of optimal investment decisions that rms undertake under
uncertainty. In this environment, we seek to understand the determinants of the
new stylized facts characterizing the vertical relations of rms. Several questions
naturally arise in this environment: Why does the share of vertically integrated rms
di¤er across industries and across rms within industries? How is the vertical struc-
ture of rms and industries endogenously determined? What are the implications
of rmsvertical structure on the size distribution of rms, the turnover and value
of rms? Why arent all large rms vertically integrated? How do changes in the
stochastic process (i.e. persistence) governing the uncertainty at rm level deter-
mine di¤erences in the vertical structure of an industry (i.e., the share of vertically
integrated rms)?
Our results show that, consistent with the facts presented by Hortacsu and Syver-
son (2009), vertically integrated rms are larger and more productive. Furthermore,
more productive manufacturers tend to integrate with more productive suppliers.
2Empirical research documents stylized facts on entry, exit, growth, and the size distribution of rms:
Manseld (1962); Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) and (1999a,b); Davis and Haltiwanger (1992);
Sutton (1997); Caves (1998); Bartelsman, Scarpetta, and Schivardi (2003); Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and
Scarpetta (2004); Axtel (2001); Foster Haltiwanger and Kirzan (2001); Cabral and Mata (2003); Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006); Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008); Bernard, Redding and Scott (2009);
and Hsieh and Klenow (2009); among others.
3The theoretical work on industry dynamics tries to provide interpretations of the observed hetero-
geneity across individual producers: Simon and Bonini (1958); Lucas (1978); Jovanovic (1982), Hopen-
hayn (1992 a,b); Ericson and Pakes (1995); Pakes and Ericson (1998); Cooley and Quadrini (2001);
Melitz (2003); Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004); Klette and Kortum (2004); Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006); Luttmer (2007); Asplund and Nocke (2007), Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007); Hopenhayn and
Vereshchagina (2009); and Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg (2011); among others.
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The productivity process of the manufacturers as well as the cost of vertical rela-
tions play a key role in the model. We show that when the productivity shocks
for manufacturers are less persistent, i.e. there is more uncertainty, the fraction
of vertically integrated manufacturers decline. This is consistent with the evidence
provided by Kranton and Meinhart (2000). Hence the observed di¤erence in the
level of idiosyncratic risk across industry, as documented by Castro, Clementi and
MacDonald (2009), are likely to play an important role in vertical relations within
industries.
The current paper is related to two literatures. First, it introduces vertical re-
lations into industry dynamics models (see Hopenhayn 1992 and Hopenhayn and
Rogerson 1993). Second, it is related to recent papers that study how di¤erent or-
ganizational forms might emerge as optimal decisions by the rms. In particular,
McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) propose frameworks of incom-
plete contracting in which nal-goods manufacturers decide whether to outsource
production of intermediate goods or produce them in-house. The key factor deter-
mining the organizational structure is the externality e¤ect yielding the thickness
of the market for inputs: The more other nal goods manufacturers choose to out-
source productions of intermediate goods, the more attractive it becomes for one
manufacturer to do so as well. These papers, however, consider homogenous pro-
ducers who decide on their vertical relations within a static environment without
any shocks.
1.1.1 Facts on Vertical Integration
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009) show that VI status is related to di¤erences in
establishment types for the U.S economy.4 As Table 1 shows, vertically integrated
establishments are larger on average. Between 1977 and 1997 vertically integrated
plants constitute relatively small fraction, 8 to 9.5 percent, of all establishments
of the economy (row 4). Focusing only on multi-unit establishments, vertically
integrated plants account for roughly 35 to 40 percent of these multi-unit businesses
(row1/row2). Despite their modest share of the overall number of establishments,
vertically integrated businesses account for a much larger employment share, 25-30
percent, and roughly half of multi-unit employment (last row).
4 In order to state if a rm is VI rst they determine the industry a¢ liation of every establishment in
the Economic Census (EC), using the Input-Output Industry Classication System (IOIC) by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (EC contains SIC codes so they reclassify it into IOIC). Second, they identify in
which industry rms operate. Third, they verify whether any substantial links are present between pairs of
industries based on volume trade ows using 1987 I-O Tables: a substantial link exists between an industry
A and any other industry if A buys at least ve percent of its intermediate materials, or any other industry
to which A sells at least 5% of its output. Finally, they nd all establishments that the rm owns on both
ends of a substantial vertical link and classify them as being vertically integrated.
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Table 1: Aggregate Patterns of Vertical Integration, 1977-1997
Non-farm Private Economy
Year 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
VI Establishments (thousands) 384.3 421.7 546.7 519.8 549.3
Multi-unit establishments (thousands) 1033.7 1167.0 1336.8 1476.6 1605.6
Total establishments (thousands) 4862.2 5049.8 5855.5 6253.2 6831.1
VI establishment share (percent) 7.9 8.4 9.4 8.3 8.0
VI employment (millions) 20.4 21.5 26.9 26.5 28.3
Multi-unit employment (millions) 38.2 42.7 48.3 53.9 60.7
Total employment (millions) 68.1 75.7 87.7 93.6 106.1
VI employment (percent) 29.8 28.4 30.7 28.3 26.7
Source: Taken from Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007).
Therefore, vertically integrated establishments are larger on average than single-
unit businesses or non-integrated multi-units. Furthermore, the share of plants
that are vertically integrated increases with plantswithin-industry size percentiles.
While smallest plants in an industry are almost never integrated, 7 percent of the
median-sized plant are integrated, and 67 percent of plants in the top percentile of
their industry size distribution are integrated.
Figure 1 presents the size densities at rm level. It can be seen that central
tendencies are clearly di¤erent: vertically integrated rms are the largest on average
and their distribution is more skewed. Their size dominates, in rst order stochastic
dominance (FOSD) sense, to the size of not vertically integrated manufacturers.
Notice that there is an overlap among these distributions (rms with the same
11
employment levels have di¤erent vertical status).
Figure 1: Firm Size Distributions for Multi-Unit Firms, 1997.
Source: Taken from Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009).
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009) also present a conditional analysis where they
regress plants observables types like size, productivity, and factor intensities (all of
them related to plant survival) on an indicator for plantsintegration status and a
set of control variables (including industry by year xed e¤ects). The results show
that, besides being larger, vertically integrated producers display higher productivity
levels (they are on average 40 percent more productive than their unintegrated
industry cohorts). Moreover, they investigate why plants have these characteristics
and conclude that vertically integrated plants are more productive, larger, and more
capital intensive primarily because they were either born into integrated structures
that way, or because rms with vertically integrated structures that choose to expand
through mergers or acquisitions do so by incorporating existing plants that are also
of high-type.
Kranton and Minehart (2000) study the relationship between the vertical struc-
ture of rms and idiosyncratic uncertainty in demand, putting special emphasis in
a special case of vertical relation, networks (an intermediate level of organization
12
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between VI and markets). In the last few decades the importance of input procure-
ment by manufacturer-supplier exchange networks has increased a lot.5 Therefore,
Kranton and Minehart (2000) study the conditions under which industries are likely
to be organized as networks.
In their model, manufacturers can decide to build a dedicated asset to produce
their own inputs, or they can invest in links to external sellers from which they buy
specialized inputs or, alternatively, they get inputs from arm-length markets. The
results indicate that there is a connection between industrial structure and uncer-
tainty in demand. Networks appear to be more e¢ cient than vertically integrated
structures when uncertainty in demand is substantial: higher dispersion of buyers
idiosyncratic demand shocks should be associated with network-like industrial struc-
tures and more connected network structures.
Their result is consistent with several case studies. They cite the case of the
US automobile industry in 1920, when there was an increase in uncertainty because
of competition from the emerging used-car market and new independent manufac-
turers. After that, the big automakers Ford and GMC moved away from vertical
integration to exible arrangements with independent suppliers (suggesting that dis-
integration is a response to underlying environmental uncertainty). The same trend
occurred in the lm industry in the 1940s, when the volatility in demand for Holly-
wood movies increased due to the advent of television, and rms moved away from
vertical integration to a more exible system with outsourcing for many aspects of
lm production.
Summarizing, we want to focus on the following empirical facts documented
in Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009) and the main result presented in Kranton and
Meinhart (2000):
 Fact 1) Vertically integrated plants are larger on average and their size distri-
bution is more skewed.
 Fact 2) When vertically integrating, big and e¢ cient downstream rms choose
to acquire upstream production units that are also big and e¢ cient.
 Fact 3) The fraction of vertically integrated plants increases with the plants
5For example, from 1980 to 1990, the major car manufacturers reduced their number of direct input
suppliers by more than 50 percent (Noteboom, 1999). This trend is more prominent in Japanese automobile
and electronic manufacturing. The number of direct suppliers to Japanese car manufacturers in 1988 was
roughly one half of what it was for American or European manufacturers, for similar volumes of production
(Lamming, 1993). For electronics and automobiles, Nishiguchi (1994) presents wide-ranging evidence from
Japan on how rms rely more and more on a subset of suppliers with whom they maintain close business
ties. In the period from 1980 to 1990, Fuji Electric Tokyo bought an additional 7 percent of its inputs from
sub-contractors but it has reduced the number of principal subcontractors by 38 percent. On average,
electronic assembly contractors have 3.36 regular costumer each of whom placed orders several times per
year.
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within-industry size percentiles.
 Fact 4) Vertically integrated plants have higher productivity.
 Fact 5) When uncertainty in demand is substantial, rms are more likely to
invest in links with specic investments (rather than becoming vertically inte-
grated or transact standardized inputs in the market).
1.2 Environment
1.2.1 Key features of the model
We develop a long-run dynamic industry equilibrium model with heterogeneous
rms interacting as buyers and sellers of inputs. Final good manufacturers are
heterogeneous in their productivity, which is stochastic, denoted by z. They need
one unit of input to produce. In order to obtain it they have three options: buy
homogeneous inputs from a supplier in the competitive market; build relation with a
supplier (i.e., link) to buy a specialized input; or become vertically integrated with
a supplier to produce in-house a specialized input. With this unit of input they
produce z units of the nal good. The nal good is homogeneous and is sold in a
competitive market.
Suppliers can produce either a standardized (homogeneous) input, or if inte-
grated/linked they can produce a specialized input. When producing a specialized
input, suppliers di¤er in their productivity level, which is denoted by ". When pro-
ducing a standardized input, suppliers are homogenous and standardized inputs are
sold in a competitive market.
When a manufacturer enters the industry, since it is unattached (it does not
have an existing specialized supplier; it is neither VI nor linked), it has to obtain
its inputs from the market for standardized inputs. In particular, it pays a price ps
to buy one unit of input. It is assumed that this price is determined by Bertrand
competition among unattached suppliers. Once ps is paid, the manufacturer learns
the productivity ", of the supplier. Given the (z; ") pair, the manufacturer, if it
does not exit the industry, has three options: rst, it can simply ignore " and use
the standardized input. In this case the manufacturer simply produces z units of
the nal good and pays the xed cost of production (Cmf ). It is assumed that pro-
ductivity of an unattached supplier is iid over time. Next period this manufacturer
will start the period in exactly the same situation (as an unattached manufacturer),
this is paying Cmf , buying one unit of input and learning a new z and ".
Second, given (z; "), the manufacturer can invest (h) to become linked with the
particular supplier (we refer to links as L). In this case the manufacturer produces
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z and pays Cmf   c(z; "), where c(z; ") represents the cost advantage associated with
getting a specialized input from a particular supplier. A manufacturer pays for a
specialized input pLs , which is determined by Nash Bargaining. As long as the man-
ufacturer and supplier remain linked, " remains the same. Next period if z remains
the same, the pair continues to be linked. If z changes, however, the manufacturer
starts next period as an unattached manufacturer (i.e. it has all the same options)
with a particular " at hand (with the same supplier). Finally, the manufacturer
can pay h + PV I and become vertically integrated with a particular supplier and
produce in-house a specialized input. In this case, it produces z and faces the cost
Cmf + C
V I
f   c(z; "). Here CV If represents the additional cost of being vertically
integrated. Once a manufacturer and a supplier become vertically integrated, they
continue to do so until z changes upon which manufacturer can reoptimize, although
in order to continue vertically integrated the manufacturer does not need to make
any investment.
In this framework, once a manufacturer buys form a supplier it cannot switch
partner until next period, thus market frictions induce a hold-up problem (as in
Grossman and Hart 1986) to linked manufacturers.6 Moreover, uncertainty plays a
key role. Given that under vertical integration manufacturers face a relatively high
cost of governance (as in Grossman and Helpman 2002), reected by a higher xed
cost of production, vertical integration reduces exibility when facing a negative
shock (compared to links and the use of standardized inputs).
Therefore, there is a clear trade-o¤between links and vertical integration. On the
one hand, a linked manufacturer has lower xed costs but, faces higher endogenous
variable costs (determined by the input price negotiation, as it will be explained later
on). On the other hand, becoming vertically integrated requires a bigger investment,
and imply higher xed costs, but lower variable costs to manufacturers. From now
on, we use the terms manufacturer and downstream rms, as well as suppliers and
upstream rms, interchangeably (notice subscripts and superscripts m and s, for
manufacturers and suppliers, respectively).
1.2.2 Incumbent rms problem
We assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Thus, by a law of large num-
bers, all aggregate quantities and prices are deterministic over time, although at the
6The hold-up problem is induced by the opportunistic behavior of the supplier. After matching with a
given supplier, once the manufacturer has sunk the investment h; there is a bilateral monopoly situation and
the supplier seeks to renegotiate the agreement increasing the input price from ps to pLs . This increases
the incentives of the manufacturer to buy standardized inputs or become vertically integrated because
the manufacturer is not the full residual claimant of the additional returns the investment generates.
Anticipating this, the buyer has an incentive to take the supplier into the rm (becoming VI).
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rm level, from the point of view of a manufacturer, each rm still faces idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty. We will focus on steady-state stationary equilibrium in which all
aggregate variables are constant over time.
Manufacturers
By using one unit of input, a manufacturer produces a quantity z of homogeneous
nal goods, where z indicates the manufacturers managerial ability, and sell the
production in a competitive market at a price p. Moreover, we assume that z is
independent across rms and follows a Markov process with cdf F (z0=z) and density
function f(z0=z). In addition, we assume that F is strictly decreasing in z and
z 2 Z, where Z = fz1; z2; ::::; zng and zi+1 > zi for all i. In other words, the higher
is the managerial ability of a manufacturer today, the more likely it will be higher
tomorrow.7
Unattached manufacturer
An unattached manufacturer, at the beginning of every period before the current
productivity shock is realized, has to pay a xed cost of production, Cmf . In addition,
it pays an up-front price, ps, for the standardized input to a randomly matched
supplier. Figure 2 represents the decisions and timing.
Figure 2: Timing for an unattached manufacturer.
7As in Hopenhayn (1992a), this assumption implies that expected discounted prots are an increasing
function of rms current productivity shock.
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Once Cmf and ps are paid, the idiosyncratic productivity shock, z, is realized
and the manufacturer learns the quality of the specialized input the supplier can
produce. We assume that the suppliers type, ", has density function gs("), and
" 2 E, where E = f"1; "2; ::::; "ng and "i+1 > "i for all i. As explained before, " is a
match-specic productivity, which can also be interpreted as the managerial ability
of the supplier to design and produce a new good and input, and to synchronize
production process, together with the matched manufacturer.
Once z and " are known, the manufacturer decides whether to stay or exit the
industry for the next period, and, if it stays in the industry, it must decide whether
to use standardized inputs or specialized inputs. In addition, in each situation, it
has also to decide whether to produce or not. Thus, if the productivity is very
low, in order to avoid paying the xed costs and the cost of the standardized input,
the manufacturers may decide to exit the industry for next period. Therefore, as
in standard industry dynamics models, there is endogenous exit, hence, in steady
state, there is ongoing entry and exit of manufacturers. If the manufacturer stays in
the industry and decides to use standardized inputs it continues as an unattached
rm (paying ps again and learning new values for z and ").
In order to use specialized inputs the unattached manufacturer has two alterna-
tives, either to become linked with the supplier or become vertically integrated with
it (acquire suppliers plant). In both cases, the manufacturer must make specic
investments, h (this cost can be thought of as cost in designing a suitable input
for the pair z and " -which is specic to the match- i.e. training costs, costs of
providing equipment, know-how, etc.). This investment has two e¤ects, to keep the
same suppliers type ", and to reduce the variable costs to c(z; "),. We assume that
z and " are complements. In particular lets assumed that the variable cost function
c(z; ") satises increasing di¤erences.8 ;9
If the manufacturer becomes linked with the supplier, we assume that the re-
duction in variable costs lasts until z changes, and in that case, in order to take
advantage of specialized inputs the manufacturer has to invest again h designing a
suitable input for the new pair (z; "). Moreover, once the specic investment is sunk,
the price for the specialized input, pLs (z; "), is negotiated (determined by Nash Bar-
8A manufacturer of type z that is matched with a supplier of type " has cost advantage c(z; ") that
satises the following property:
c(zi; "j)  c(zi; "j 1) > c(zi 1; "j)  c(zi 1; "j 1) 8i; j = 1; ::; n
9The assumptions made on the variable cost function generates a rm behavior which, as it will be
shown later on, is in line with new empirical evidence. In particular, Kuglery and Verhoogen (2012),
using data from the Colombian manufacturing census, documents that larger plants charge more for their
outputs and pay more for their material inputs, and proposes a model of endogenous input and output
quality choices by heterogeneous rms to explain the observed patterns.
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gaining Solution, NBS). Hence specic investments are subject to hold-up problem
which increases the incentives to buy standardized inputs or become vertically inte-
grated, as explained before.10 Notice that a linked manufacturer rm has the same
xed costs (Cmf ) has lower variable costs (p
L
s (z; ") c(z; ")) relative to an unattached
rm. If the manufacturer decides to become vertically integrated, in addition to the
specic investment, h, it has to pay an acquisition price PV I to the supplier (as it
will become clear later PV I will correspond to the market value of the supplier). By
becoming vertically integrated the manufacturer avoids the hold-up problem.
As in Grossman and Helpman (2002), due to the lack of complete specialization
and the extra governance costs associated to managing di¤erent plants, we assume
that VI increases manufacturers xed production costs. This means that a verti-
cally integrated manufacturer has to pay, in addition to the same xed cost as the
standardized manufacturer, Cmf , and the xed cost of the acquired supplier, C
s
f , a
managerial xed cost,  (which is assumed to be positive). Furthermore, notice
that uncertainty plays a key role: VI increases rmsxed costs to Cmf + C
s
f + 
reducing its exibility when facing a negative shock (when compared to links and
market transactions).
When becoming vertically integrated we assume that, in contrast with the link
case, the cost advantage c(z; "), for di¤erent levels of z, is permanent. We assume
that, by paying a higher xed cost of production every period, a vertically integrated
rm redesigns the input every time z changes without any additional cost. For the
next period, the manufacturer starts as a VI rm.
Therefore, the state variables for an unattached manufacturer are its idiosyn-
cratic productivity, z, and the quality of its supplier, ". Thus, assuming stationarity
(distributions, and thus also prices, do not change over time), the value function for
the unattached manufacturer rm is:
V U(z; ") = max
x0U2fExit;U;L;V Ig
I(x0U=U;Exit)V
UU(z; ")+I(x0U=L)V
UL(z; ")+I(x0U=V I)V
UV I(z; ");
(1.1)
where x0U : [z; "] ! fExit; U; L; V Ig denotes the decision rule associated to the
vertical relation chosen by the unattached manufacturer, and I is the indicator
function given x0U .
The rst term within the max operator in this value function corresponds to
the case where the manufacturer remains unattached using standardized inputs in
10Since the solution anticipates the hold-up, the specialized input price pLs (z; ") is the time consistent
price for the specialized input (Nash bargaining over present discounted values after h is incurred). In
addition, Nash bargaining implies that more productive rms pay more for inputs (consistent with Kugler
and Verhoogen (2012)).
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current production and decides whether to exit or not for the next period. Formally,
the corresponding value function associated to this choice is
V UU(z; ") = max
aU2f0;1g
aUpz ps Cmf +
8>>>><>>>>:I(x
0
U=Exit)
0| {z }
Exit
; I(x0U=U)
X
z0
X
"0
V U(z0; "0)f(z0jz)gs("0)| {z }
Unattached (new draw of supplier)
9>>>>=>>>>; ;
where aU : [z; "] ! f0; 1g is the static production decision rule (the unattached
manufacturer decides whether to produce or not in the current period).
The second term within the max operator in Equation (1) corresponds to the
situation in which the manufacturer uses specialized inputs by linking with the
supplier. The value function for this case is
V UL(z; ") = max
aL2f0;1g
aL[pz   (pLs (z; ")  ps) + c(z; ")]  ps   Cmf   h
+
"
V L(z; ")f(z0 = zjz) +
X
z0 6=z
V U(z0; ")f(z0jz)
#
;
thus the manufacturer decides whether to produce or not, aL : [z; "] ! f0; 1g, and
negotiates the input price, pLs (z; "), with the supplier. As long as z remains the
same for the next period, the pair continues to be linked (as it can be seen in the
rst term in the continuation value). If z changes, however, the manufacturer starts
next period as an unattached manufacturer with the same previous " at hand (look
at the second term in the continuation value).
The third term within the max operator in Equation (1) represents the value of
becoming vertically integrated with the supplier,
V UV I(z; ") = max
aV I2f0;1g
aV I [pz+c(z; ")] ps CV If|{z}
Csf+
 Cmf  (PV I+h)+
X
z0
V V I(z0; ")f(z0jz);
where aV I : [z; "] ! f0; 1g is the static production decision rule, and CV If is the
additional xed cost of production of a vertically integrated manufacturer, CV If =
Csf + . Thus, the manufacturer decides whether to produce or not and it will start
the next period as a vertically integrated rm, that is, with the same cost advantage
as a rm that continues linked, but with higher xed costs of production. By
standard dynamic programming arguments (e.g., see Stokey and Lucas (1989)), one
can show that there is a unique value function satisfying these Bellman equations.
The same applies to the Bellman equations in the next section.
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Notice that by becoming a linked rm, the manufacturer faces lower xed costs
(just Cmf ) and higher variable costs (p
L
s (z; ")  c(z; ")) relative to becoming a verti-
cally integrated rm. Besides, by becoming vertically integrated, the manufacturer
faces higher xed costs (Cmf +C
V I
f ) and lower variable costs (it does not pay ps and
receives the cost advantage c(z; ")) relative to an unattached manufacturer; and has
higher xed costs (Cmf +C
V I
f ) and lower variable costs (doesnt pay p
L
s (z; ")) relative
to a linked rm. Thus, there is a clear trade-o¤ of linking versus becoming vertically
integrated. We will discuss later on how the properties of the stochastic process (i.e.
persistence and variance) governing the uncertainty at rm level also plays a role
in these trade-o¤s, and thus determine di¤erences in the vertical structure of rms
across industries.
Linked manufacturer
At the beginning of every period, a manufacturer linked with a supplier of type
" pays a xed cost of production Cmf , and productivity z is realized. If the new
productivity shock z is equal to the previous shock, then the link continues and
rms trade inputs at the same negotiated input price pLs (z; ") from the previous
period and production takes place. Otherwise, if the realization of the new shock z is
di¤erent from the previous one, the link is broken and the manufacturer has to decide
again whether to invest in a link or not. Moreover, if the link is broken, it becomes
again an unattached manufacturer, hence it has the same continuation options as
an unattached rm (notice that V U(z; ") contains the options of reestablishing the
link, becoming VI or using the standardized input), with the only di¤erence that it
is matched with the same supplier as in the previous period.
The value function of a linked manufacturer when z has not changed is given by
V L(z; ") = pz   pLs (z; ") + c(z; )  Cmf
+
(
V L(z; ")f(z0 = zjz) + P
z0 6=z
V U(z0; ")f(z0jz)
)
;
(1.2)
which, after some simple operations, becomes
V L(z; ") =
pz pLs (z;")+c(z;") Cmf
1 f(z0=zjz) +
(1 f(z0=zjz))
1 f(z0=zjz)
P
z0 6=z
V U(z0; ")f(z0jz): (1.3)
Vertically integrated manufacturer
A manufacturer that is vertically integrated with a supplier of type " pays xed
costs of production Cmf and C
V I
f ; productivity z is realized (while " remains the
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same). Therefore, it decides current production, aV I 2 f0; 1g, and the state for the
next period (Figure 3). It has the same continuation options as for the unattached
rm (invest in L, get a new supplier, exit the industry), but in order to continue
vertically integrated with same supplier it has to make no additional investment.
In the case of investing in a link (disintegrate but remain matched with the same
supplier) the manufacturer produces today as a vertically integrated rm and, since
next period on, it has to pay a negotiated input price pLs (z; ").
Figure 3: Timing for a vertically integrated manufacturer.
According to the previous timing, the value function for a vertically integrated
manufacturer looks like in Equation (4). A manufacturer with productivity z that
enters the current period being vertically integrated with a supplier of type " , after
paying the xed costs, has to decide whether to produce or not so as to maximize the
per period prot. Next, it has to decide in which state it enters the next period, this
is either continue vertically integrated (with the fourth continuation value), without
making any additional investment, or disintegrate. In case it decides to disintegrate,
it still has the option to continue producing with the same supplier by becoming
linked with it after investing h (with the third continuation value). Finally, it can
also become an unattached manufacturer starting the next period with a new ", or
exit the industry.
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V V I(z; ") = max
aV I2f0;1g;x0V I2fExit;U;L;V Ig
aV I [pz + c(z; ")]  CV If   Cmf   hI(x0V I=L)(1.4)
+
8>>><>>>:I(x0V I=Exit)0| {z }Exit + I(x0V I=U)
X
z0
X
"0
V U(z0; "0)f(z0jz)gs("0)| {z }
Unattached
+I(x0V I=L)
"
V L(z; ")f(z0 = zjz) +
X
z0 6=z
V U(z0; ")f(z0jz)
#
| {z }
Link
+I(x0V I=V I)
X
z0
V V I(z0; ")f(z0jz)| {z }
Vertical Integration
9>>>>=>>>>; ; (1.5)
where x0V I : [z; "] ! fExit; U; L; V Ig is the decision rule, that is the state chosen
for the next period, and I is the indicator function given x0V I .
Suppliers
Unattached supplier
Unattached suppliers produce one unit of an homogeneous input and compete in
prices. They have zero marginal cost and pay a xed cost, Csf ; every period. Once
they match with a manufacturer, the quality " of the specialized input they are able
to produce is realized. In case they remain as unattached input supplier the quality
of the match, ", is iid over time and across suppliers. The value function of an
unattached supplier is
WU(z; ") = I(xU=U)
"
ps   Csf + 
X
"0
X
z0
W S(z0; "0)Jm(z0)gs("0)
#
| {z }
produce standardized inputs
(1.6)
+I(xU=L)
"
pLs (z; ")  Csf + WL()f(z0 = zjz) + 
X
z0 6=z
WU()f(z0jz)
#
| {z }
linked
+I(xU=V I)PV I(z; ")| {z }
VI
(1.7)
22
where xU : [z; "] ! fExit; U; L; V Ig is the current period decision rule of the
unattached manufacturer that is matched with this supplier, and I is the corre-
sponding indicator function given xU . The function Jm(z0) is an equilibrium object
that represents the density of manufacturers, for each particular productivity level
z, that will be looking for a standardized supplier in the next period. For each value
of z the density Jm(z0) is determined by the process of entry, exit, investment in
links and vertical integration.
Specialized supplier
A specialized (linked) supplier produces one unit of the input using the same
technology as an unattached supplier. It o¤ers an input of heterogeneous quality
which is permanent over time (as explained before, conditional on producing with
the same manufacturer every period). In addition it negotiates the input price in
a bilateral monopoly situation with the manufacturer, due to the market frictions
(once the manufacturer is matched with a supplier it cannot switch partner until
next period).
The value function of a linked supplier is
WL(z; ") = pLs (z; ") Csf +
(
WL(z; ")f(z0 = zjz) +
X
z0 6=z
WU(z0; ")f(z0jz)
)
; (1.8)
which, after some simple operations, becomes
WL(z; ") =
pLs (z; ")  Csf
1  f(z0 = zjz) +
(1  f(z0 = zjz))
1  f(z0 = zjz)
X
z0 6=z
WU(z0; ")f(z0jz): (1.9)
We assume that, if a linked manufacturer breaks the link with a supplier, then
the supplier returns to the standardized inputs market, gets matched with another
unattached manufacturer, and gets a new draw of " from gs("). In addition, if a
supplier becomes vertically integrated it gets PV I and disappears. Furthermore, if
the manufacturer disintegrates, then the supplier appears again as an unattached
supplier.
Equilibrium prices for the specialized input and suppliers acquisition price
Given all the previous value functions, we can now dene the prices for the special-
ized inputs and the acquisition price for a supplier rm that a manufacturer pays
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when vertically integrating. The rst one is dened, according to Nash Bargaining,
as follows:
pLs (z; ") = arg max
pLs
24V L(z; ") 
0@ V UU(z; ")| {z }
Manufacturers outside option
1A35 (1.10)
24WL(z; ") 
0@ WU(z; ")| {z }
Suppliers outside option
1A351  ; (1.11)
where  is the bargaining power of the manufacturer. Thus solving for the bargained
specialized input price and using the previsously dened value functions we get:
pLs (z; ") = (1  f(z0 = zjz))(1  )
"
pz+c() Cmf
1 f(z0=zjz) +
(1 f(z0=zjz))
1 f(z0=zjz)
P
z0 6=z
V U()f(z0jz)
 

pz   ps   Cmf + max

0;
P
z0
P
"0
V U(z0; "0)f(z0jz)gs("0)

 
"
 Csf
1 f(z0=zjz) +
(1 f(z0=zjz))
1 f(z0=zjz)
P
z0 6=z
WU(z0; ")f(z0jz)
 

ps   Csf + 
P
"0
P
z0
WU(z0; "0)Jm(z0)gs("0)

:
(1.12)
Thus, the specialized input price depends only on the value functions of the
unattached manufacturer and supplier. Moreover, I assume that an unattached
manufacturer which optimally chooses to become vertically integrated makes a take-
it-of-leave-it o¤er to the supplier and pays to him a price PV I that is the present
discounted value of being an unattached supplier. This is, we assume that the
market value of the supplier is PV I = Ez0;"0WU(z0; "0).
1.2.3 Free Entry Condition
There is free entry of manufacturers who are ex-ante identical. We assume that
manufacturer rms that enter the industry make no specic investment. This means
that entrants cannot enter the industry being vertically integrated or linked rms,
they just enter as unattached manufacturers.
They must pay a sunk downstream entry cost, Cme  0, the xed cost of produc-
tion, Cmf  0 and they buy one unit of the standardized input paying ps After that,
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they draw z from gm(z) and then match randomly with a supplier according to gs(").
Thus, the value of the expected future discounted prots of a new downstream rm
is
V me (p; ps) =
X
"
X
z
V U(z; ")gm(z)gs("): (1.13)
In the input industry there is also free entry. Entrants are ex-ante homogeneous
producers and enter the input industry as unattached suppliers. They rst have to
pay a sunk upstream entry cost, Cse  0; and xed cost, Csf  0. After doing so,
they earn ps and match randomly with a manufacturer, according to Jm(z), and
their type " is revealed according to gs("). Thus, the value at entry for an upstream
rm is
W se (ps; p) =
X
"
X
z
WU(z; ")Jm(z)gs("): (1.14)
1.2.4 Characterization of Equilibrium
Before dening the stationary equilibrium in this model lets rst analyze further
the prot function of an unattached manufacturer that reects some properties of
the value function. As mentioned before, we assumed complementarity between
manufacturer and suppliers types, in particular we assumed that the variable cost
function c(z; ") satises increasing di¤erences. This means that manufacturers of
di¤erent types can produce more e¢ ciently with a supplier of high "-type, but the
cost advantage is greater for producers of high z-types. Therefore, assuming a given
functional form for c(z; ") we can plot c(z; ") + Cmf (solid grey curves in Figure 4)
which is weakly decreasing in ", together with the revenue function, pz; (solid black
curve in Figure 4) for an unattached manufacturer. The distance between the latter
and ps + Cmf is the per period prot of an unattached manufacturer.
The upper curve c(z; ")+Cmf (the straight line) in Figure 4 represents the case of
the least e¢ cient manufacturer (denoted by z). We can see that when it is matched
with the most e¢ cient supplier (denoted by ") it does not improve in costs. In
contrast, when the most e¢ cient manufacturer (denoted by z) is matched with the
most e¢ cient supplier (denoted by ") there is a big decline in total costs (lower
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curve).
Figure 4: Costs, revenues and prots of an unattached manufacturer.
Furthermore, for an unattached manufacturer of type zi matched with a supplier
of type "j, the static gain from using specialized inputs (net of costs corresponding
to the cases of VI or link) is the di¤erence between the distances A and B. Clearly,
as it can be seen in the picture, the static gain from using specialized inputs is
increasing in z and ": We will use this property of the prot functions, together
with the characteristics assumed on F , to state that the value of investing in the
use of specialized inputs is increasing in z and ".
To gain more intuition about how the model works lets show which vertical
structure a manufacturer chooses for next period given the current productivity.
In the following proposition we focus on an unattached manufacturer rm, but the
same reasoning should be followed for the case of a vertically integrated rm and a
linked one:
Proposition 1 There exist a number z > 0 and a threshold function b"(z) :
[z1; zn]! ["1;1) for an unattached manufacturer rm such that:
xU(z; ") 2
8><>:
fL; V Ig for all f(z; ") 2 Z  E : "  b"(z)g;
fExitg for all f(z; ") 2 Z  E : z < z and " < b"(z)g;
fUg for all f(z; ") 2 Z  E : z  z and " < b"(z)g:
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Proof Lets rst dene z as the minimum productivity level at which an
unattached manufacturer, before observing the current supplier type " it is matched
with, decides to stay in the industry and get a new draw of supplier for next period.
Lets compare the two continuations values in V UU(z; "), from Equation (1). Given
that F is decreasing in z and c(z; ") is increasing in z, the continuation value of
getting a new draw of ", Ez0;"0

V U(z0; "0)=z

, is monotone increasing in z. Therefore,
as V U(z; ") is continuous in z, by the intermediate value theorem there exists a
thresholds z and it is singled valued, and dened as in Hopenhayn (1992):
z = inf
(
z 2 Z :
X
z0
X
"0
V U(z0; "0)f(z0jz)gs("0)  0
)
:
Now lets look for the set of minimum productivity levels for z and " at which the
value of using specialized goods (becoming vertically integrated or linked) V UL(z; ")
or V UV I(z; ") is greater than or equal to being an unattached manufacturer. We
know that for pairs of (z; ") formed by low values of z and ", given the assumptions
on costs and sunk specic investment, the rm does not decide to become vertically
integrated or set up links. Furthermore, in order to have available the continuation
values corresponding to VI or L the rm has to invest h + PV I or h, respectively.
This means that the corresponding expected future discounted prots plus present
revenues must be high enough to recover the costs h + PV I or h. But, given that
the continuation values of becoming vertically integrated or linked are monotone
increasing in z and ", and as V UV I(z; ") and V UL(z; ") are continuous in z and ",
for each value of z; by the intermediate value theorem, there exists " (a threshold),
which is singled valued, at which the unattached manufacturer decides to become
vertically integrated or linked. Then lets dene a correspondence e"(z) that maps
values of z into values for "; e"(z) : Z ! ["1;1). Thus e"(z) is formally dened as
e"(z)  " 2 ["1;1) : given z 2 Z; maxV UL(z; "); V UV I(z; ")	  V UU(z; ")	 :
Then, lets dene a function ee"(z) : [z1; zn]! ["1;1) as
ee"(z)  f# 2 [0;1) : #  inf (e"(z))g :
Then as the function ee"(z) is continuous and monotone decreasing in z there
exists a threshold z such that ee"(z) = "n, where "n is the minimum " 2 E. Then
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we can dene a function b"(z) : Z ! ["1;1) as
b"(z)  ( ee"(z) for z  z1 for z < z
)
:
Therefore, for all (z;b"(z)) 2 Z E a downstream unattached manufacturer rm
decides to become vertically integrated or have links with the supplier.
Basically the next proposition states that if an unattached manufacturer rm
with a given productivity pair (z; ") decides to become vertically integrated or linked,
then any rm with higher e¢ ciency levels (z; ") will also become vertically integrated
or linked.
Intuitively the previous proposition is a characterization of the decision rule for
an unattached manufacturer. It states that, under the assumptions made on costs,
this decision rule look like presented in Figure 5. In the horizontal axis we have
the productivity of the manufacturer and in the vertical axis the productivity of
the supplier. The gure shows the regions of (z; ) under which an unattached
manufacturer decides to exit the industry, to become vertically integrated, to set up
link or to continue unattached for next period.
In panel A we have the case in which z \ (z;e"(z)) = ? for all (z;e"(z)) 2 Z E,
thus there is only one relevant threshold (z) that manufacturers consider to exit
the industry. This is, a manufacturer with a productivity shock bellow z decides
to exit the industry independently to which suppliers type it is matched with. If
its productivity level z is above that threshold, the rm decides to remain active
in the industry, and if it is matched with an e¢ cient supplier it decides to become
vertically integrated or linked.
In panel B we have the case in which z \ (z;e"(z)) 6= ? for all (z;e"(z)) 2 Z E,
thus there is a set of relevant thresholds that manufacturers consider to exit the in-
dustry. Furthermore, in contrast with Panel A, a manufacturer with a productivity
shock bellow z can survive if it is matched with an e¢ cient supplier. The equilib-
rium shape of the set of relevant thresholds will depend on the parametrization of
the model. We will focus on that in the calibration section.
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Figure 5: Decision rule for an (z; ")-unattached
manufacturer for next period.
Panel A Panel B
1.2.5 Stationary Equilibrium
The stationary equilibrium denition is standard (for a detailed formal denition
see the appendix): A stationary equilibrium in this model is a list of value functions
and policy functions for manufacturers and suppliers, prices, invariant measures of
rms, and a mass of entrants such that given the prices the policy functions solve
the rmsproblem, the free entry conditions and the market clearing conditions are
satised, and the stationary measures of rms are xed points. In the appendix, it
is also explained the algorithm used to compute the equilibrium.
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1.3 Quantitative Analysis
1.3.1 Calibration-Preliminary Results
To solve the model numerically, we need to specify functional forms for the demand
and rms technology and assign parameter values. Basically, we calibrate our model
so that the industry stationary equilibrium matches selected characteristics of the
U.S. manufacturing sector taken from the U.S. Census Bureau and from Hortaçsu
and Syverson (2007 and 2009). Table 2 summarizes the values for the parameters
set a priori.
Table 2: Parameters set a priori
Parameters Denition Value
 Bargaining power of the buyer 0:5 assumed
 Discount factor 0:96 assumed
 Inverse of demand elasticity 1:164 Nicholson (1989)
 Autoregressive parameter 0:93 Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
Manufacturers and suppliers are assumed to have the same bargaining power,
 = 1=2. In addition, we set a discount factor value  = 0:96 consistent with a 4%
interest rate. We assume a constant elasticity of demand, p = Q , where Q is the
aggregate production and  is the inverse demand elasticity which we take equal to
1:164.11
We assume that shocks z has lognormal distribution and follows an AR(1)
process,
ln zt =  +  ln zt 1 + t; with t  N(0; 2);
where t is the iid shock, and the parameter  is a measure of persistence of the
idiosyncratic productivity process. Changes in the persistence of the shocks will
have an impact on how a rm decides its vertical structure given the properties of
the costs. Therefore, if persistence is very high, then, loosely speaking, an e¢ cient
rm expects that high shocks today will be around for a long time. Conversely,
if shocks are not very persistent, then the manufacturer will take into account the
possibility of incurring high losses (due to high xed costs) or not recovering the
irreversible investment (h+PV I), because there is a strong possibility that they will
be incurred relatively soon.
11We take the average of the elasticity values published in Nicholson (1989): Food 0.21, Medical Services
0.20, Automobiles 1.20, Housing (Rental) 0.18, Housing (Owner-Occupied) 1.2, Gasoline 0.54, Electricity
1.14, Giving to Charity 1.29, Beer 1.13, Marijuana 1.5.
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A 25-points grid was assumed for both discretized shocks z and ", where we
assume Z = E to simplify.12 The transition matrix for z was obtained by Tauchens
method which approximates the previous AR(1) process for the idiosyncratic shocks.
The estimation of its persistence parameter  was taken from Hopenhayn and Roger-
son (1993), assuming that rms in both models are hit by the same stochastic idio-
syncratic productivity process13. We took the invariant distribution of the Markov
chain matrix for z as the initial distribution gm(z) and as gs(").
With respect to the function c(z; ") we assume a function as follows
c(zi; "j) = T1

zi   z1
zn   z1

"j   "1
"n   "1
1 
+ T2;
which is increasing in zi and "j, with  2 [0; 1]. The parameter T1 is the maximum
gain from searching a supplier, for the most e¢ cient manufacturer (being zn and
matched with an "n supplier reduces the nonsunk cost T1); and T2 is the gain from
investment (by investing h+PV I in becoming vertically integrated, or h in becoming
linked, the manufacturer reduce the nonsunk cost in this amount T2, independently
on the type of the supplier it is matched with). The parameter  indicates how
important is the manufacturers type in the decline of variable costs when investment
in links and VI take place. Notice that c(z; ") is exible, in the sense that it allows
for the absence of increasing di¤erences.
Table 3 presents the value for the calibrated parameters with the corresponding
moments the model tries to match. Figure 6 shows the shape of the function c(zi; j)
for the parameter values presented above:
12The number of grid points was selected so as to have a smooth enough behavior of rmsdecisions.
13One could also assume that, under a Leontie¤ production function, employment follows the same
stochastic process as revenues.
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Table 3: Calibrated Parameters and moments to t.
Denition Target Denition

2
T1
T2
Autoregressive intercept
Standard deviation of .
Gain from searching for high "
Cost reduction
0
0.15
75
0
9>=>;
revenue
distrib.
of rms
Cmf Fixed cost 0.40 10%
8>>><>>>:
Annual exit rate
(Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger
and Scarpetta 2000)

Extra managerial xed cost of
a vertically integrated rm
3.15 8%  9%
(
%VI rms (Hortaçsu
and Syverson 2009)
h Investment cost of L 1.3 25%
(
% L rms
(Uzzi 1996)

Relative weight of z in cost
reduction
0.47 7%
8>>><>>>:
times the median-sized
manufacturing plant
is VI (Hortaçsu and
Syverson, 2009)
Cme Sunk cost of entry 3.01 V
m
e (1) Entry value at p = 1
Figure 6: Cost function c(z; )
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The value of the intercept, , and the variance of the error term, 2 , of the AR(1)
stochastic process for z, as well as T1 and T2 are chosen so as to t the size (revenue)
distribution of rms of the US manufacturing sector. Revenue values in the model
are expressed in millions of dollars. In particular, we use the U.S. Census Bureau
tabulated data prepared by the Small Business Administration (SBA) for year 2002.
Table 4 indicates a mean revenues for all rms of 11,434 millions of dollars.
In addition, the share of rms in the rst interval of revenues (0-0.99) of 51.45%,
and the shares of rms with revenues between (1-4.99), (5-9.99) and (10-49.99) are
22.7%, 5.7% and 7.5%, respectively. Finally, the share of the biggest rms that have
revenues above 50 millions is 12.6%. Hence we choose , 2 , T2 and T2 in order to
minimize the Euclidean distance between the data and model densities of rms in
each scale interval so as to generate a revenue distribution that is in line with Table
4.
Table 4: Size (revenue) distribution of rms
Receipt Size of Manufacturing Establishments (in millions of dollars)
Total 0-0.99 1-4.99 5-9.99 10-49.99 50+
Establishments 344,341 177,099 78,026 19,774 25,893 43,549
51.4% 22.7% 5.7% 7.5% 12.6%
Receipts ($000) 3,937,164,576 56,607,235 173,543,614 122,826,132 361,399,818 3,222,847,777
1.4% 4.4% 3.1% 9.2% 81.9%
Mean 11,434
Source : Based on Census Bureau 2002 tabulated data prepared by the SBA.
The xed cost Cmf is selected to t an exit rate of 10% (taken from Bartelsman,
Scarpetta and Shivardi, 2003). Given a normalized nal good price p = 1, given the
value function V U(z; "); the level for the sunk entry cost Cme was selected such that
Cme =
P
"
P
z
V U(z; ")gm(z)gs("). In addition, the value for xed cost, Csf , as well as
the entry cost, Cse , of suppliers were assumed to be equal to the xed cost and entry
cost of manufacturers, respectively.
The extra managerial cost for a vertically integrated manufacturer, , and the
investment cost, h, were chosen to match a share of 8 to 9 % of vertically integrated
rms and a share of linked rms 25%, respectively.14 When the relative weight of z
14Uzzi (1996) studies the Womens Dress industry where manufacturers and contractors are linked by
long-term ongoing relationships. He nds that about 25 percent of the manufacturers have networks
composed of 5 or fewer exchange partners; 30 percent have exchanges with 5 to 12 partners, while about
40 percent maintain business ties with more than 20 contractors. We take a value of 25% for our calibration
given that in our model each manufacturer is supplied with just one supplier. Notice that the exercise
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in the variable cost advantage  increases then the chance to become VI or linked
for rms with a low z productivity increases. In other words, for rms with a low
z and a high ", the variable cost advantage c(z; ") increases with . Therefore the
share small rms that become VI increases with . Thus, the value for  was chosen
so as to t the percentage of median sized manufacturing plants that are vertically
integrated.15 Table 5 shows the calibration results. It can be seen that the annual
exit rate, the share of vertically integrated and linked rms, and the percentage of
vertically integrated plants in the median-sized plants are well tted, while the t
of the size distribution of rms can be improved (Figure 7).
Table 5: Data moments and model moments.
Model Data
Share of rms by size
(revenues in millions of U.S. dollars)
0-0.99 56.4% 51.4%
1-4.99 40.2% 22.7%
5-9.99 3.1% 5.7%
10-49.99 0.4% 7.5%
50+ 0.0% 12.6%
Annual exit rate 8.6% 10%
Share of Linked rms 25.7% 25%
Share of vertically integrated rms 8.4% 8%-9%
Share of vertically integrated median-sized rms 5.2% 7%
we will perform in the following section is to decrease the persistence of the z shocks and look at what
happen with the number and share of VI and L rms. And the value of the H 0s parameters determines
the sensitivity of the decision rules to the persistence of z.
15The share of VI plants, as well as the percent of the median-sized plants that are integrated, were
taken from Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009), as exposed in the introduction.
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Figure 7. Size distribution of rms:
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1.3.2 Benchmark Economy
Equilibrium decision rules, revenue distribution of rms and vertical relations.
Figure 8 shows the policy functions of an unattached rm. The associated values of
the decision rule are as follows. The number 1 represents exit the industry, 2 stay
in the industry and get a new draw of supplier (continue being unattached), 3 stay
in the industry and set up a link, and 4 stay in the industry and become vertically
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Figure 9. Policy function of an unattached rm.
Basically, Figure 8 shows the same results derived from the theoretical section
2.3, and, in particular, the issues exposed in gure 5. The areas plotted in Figure 8
correspond to the characterization of the decision rules made in Propositions 1. Cells
containing the same number dene the vertical status for di¤erent rms. Besides,
the least e¢ cient rms decide to exit the industry. As it was explained in section 2,
rms with pairs of productivity levels z < z and " < b"(z) exit the industry (area
indicated by cells containing number 1). Unattached manufacturer rms that are
e¢ cient but matched with ine¢ cient suppliers decide to continue active and get a
new draw for next period (area indicated by cells containing number 2).
The most e¢ cient manufacturer rms (the ones with highest levels of z) decide to
become vertically integrated when they are matched with e¢ cient suppliers. There
are some manufacturers with intermediate productivity levels, which have drawn an
e¢ cient supplier, and decide to keep the same supplier by setting up a link (number
3-area). The increasing di¤erences in cost function generates the correlation of types
for high productivity levels.
Figure 9 shows the decision rules of a vertically integrated rm and has the same
interpretations as before. A particularly interesting point here is that the model
generates vertical disintegration of plants. Moreover, identical manufacturers may
di¤er in their vertical structure, and those that are vertically integrated can end
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up disintegrated or remain integrated. For example, taking a rm with high z-
productivity and an intermediate upper level for ", start decreasing the level for z
and keep " xed (given that " does not evolve over time). Then if its z-productivity
decreases enough over time, this manufacturer will decide to disintegrate and become
linked, outsourcing the input production. Furthermore, if the productivity continues
to decrease, it may decide to change supplier or exit the industry.
Figure 9. Policy function of a VI rm.
To summarize, we can see that our model induces the following behavior of rms.
Vertically integrated manufacturer rms are larger and more e¢ cient on average.
Big and e¢ cient standardized manufacturers that seek to expand though vertical
integration choose suppliers that are also large and e¢ cient as found in Hortaçsu
and Syverson (2009).
In equilibrium the model generates some big manufacturers that are not verti-
cally integrated, in line with the fact exposed in Figure 1. In Figure 10, panel A
presents the equilibrium size (revenue) distribution of manufacturing plants16. The
line with triangles represents the total size distribution of rms, while the other lines
represent, for each size, the proportion of each type of rm (U, VI, L and Entrants)
to the total share of rms for each particular size (this is, the area below each line
16Panel A in Figure 10 excludes the highest values for z so as to present a better exposition of the
distributions at the lowest productivity levels. Panel B presents the whole range of the log of z.
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adds up to the share of each category in the total number of plants). Panel B shows
the same picture in logarithmic scale.
Figure 10. Size distribution of rms.
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Notice that there is an overlap between these distributions: downstream rms
with the same high z-productivity levels di¤er in their vertical structure in the
steady state. The explanation for this, according to our model, is that some e¢ cient
manufacturers decide not to become vertically integrated and instead get a new draw
while still looking for a more e¢ cient supplier. The previous two graphs show that
the fraction of vertically integrated plants increases with the plant size. In addition,
it can also be seen that vertically integrated rms dominate (in rst order stochastic
dominance sense) the size distribution of not vertically integrated rms. This last
fact is exposed better in Figure 11, which presents just the size distribution of
vertically integrated and not vertically integrated manufacturing plants. In Figure
11 each line is the share of plants as a proportion of all plants in a particular vertical
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structure (the total area below each line adds up to one).
Figure 11. Size distribution of vertically integrated and not
vertically integrated manufacturers.
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Log Revenues
Revenue Distribution of Firms
S.D. of Not VI Firms
S.D. of VI Firms
1.3.3 How does the model work?
The model economy presented above gives rise to rich industry dynamics as manu-
facturers enter, exit and decide how to obtain their inputs. In this environment an
industrial structure emerges as the result of optimal investment decisions that rms
undertake under uncertainty. Di¤erences across industries that a¤ect rmsincen-
tives to use the VI or L margins determine rm-level TFP dynamics and have an
impact on protability, survival, size distribution of rms and average productivity
of an industry. In the following sections we use the model to address the questions
on why supply relations vary across industries and across rms within industries,
and how these relations a¤ect size distribution of rms, turnover, mobility, welfare,
aggregate output and productivity. We rst study the e¤ect that changes in the
bargaining power of manufacturers, the costs to become VI, the discount factor,
as well as the e¤ects that changes in the xed production costs have on all these
relevant variables so as understand how the model works and to interpret the main
mechanism of the model.
Finally, we focus on the main part of the paper, in which we address the following
question: How do changes in the properties of uncertainty at rm level determine
di¤erences in the vertical structure of an industry? In order to address this question
we show an experiment in which we change the persistence of the productivity shocks
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that manufacturers face. We show that when the productivity shocks for manufac-
turers are less persistent, interpreting this as higher mobility across productivity
states and thus more uncertainty, manufacturers become more exible avoiding VI
and seting up links or using standardized inputs.
This experiment is important because it provides relevant empirical implications
on the e¤ect of changes in the uncertainty at rm level on rmsvertical structure,
and shows how the model gives an alternative interpretation to important facts in
the data. For instance, as mentioned in the introduction, the previous literature on
the organization of economic activity has emphasized the role of specic investments
on vertical integration, according to which in industries with high specic invest-
ments rms tend to be vertically integrated. However, there are industries with
high specic investments, such as the womens dress industry (among other case
studies discussed in Kranton and Minehart, 2000), in which manufacturers tend to
make specic investments with specialized suppliers rather than becoming vertically
integrated. The quantitative experiment shows that in industries that are also char-
acterized by substantial uncertainty at rm level, despite the presence of specic
investments, the choice between VI and link is nontrivial. It follows from the trade-
o¤ between loosing exibility against negative shocks (under VI) and su¤ering the
hold-up problem (sharing a fraction of prots with the supplier under links). Since
industries such as the womens dress industry are also characterized by substantial
uncertainty at rm level (as well as many other industries as documented by Castro,
Clementi and MacDonald 2009) the interpretation of this experiment is important
as it shows how the model is able to explain important facts in the data.
Bargaining power and vertical structure
In this section we analyze the e¤ect of changes in the bargaining power of the
manufacturer (Table 6). When the bargaining power of the manufacturer increases,
downstream rms face a less severe hold-up problem. The average specialized input
price, pLs (), decreases from 1:39 to 1:17, which leads the manufacturers to become
linked instead of vertically integrated. As it can be seen in the table, the share
of vertically integrated rms decreases and the share of linked ones increases (the
mass of vertically integrated and linked rms reacts in the same direction). The
slight decline in the nal good price from 1 to 0:98, that yields an increase in
consumer surplus, together with a reduction in the average specialized input price,
which generates an increase in producer surplus, yields a higher aggregate welfare.
Furthermore, as the total investment increases, TFP increases.17 ;18
17See the appendix for denitions of total factor productivity (TFP) and revenue TFP (RTFP).
18Total welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surplus, which is calculated as follows:
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Table 6: Changes in bargaining power

0:5 0:6 0:7
Price 1:00 0:99 0:98
Exit Rate 0:09 0:08 0:08
Agg. Output 100:0 100:0 100:4
TFP 100:0 102:1 103:3
Welfare 100:0 100:2 101:0
Consumer surplus 100:0 100:0 100:9
Producer surplus 100:0 100:9 105:7
Share of Vertically Integrated Firms
V I
Total F irms
0:084 0:072 0:071
V I
L
0:328 0:238 0:204
Costs of VI and L and vertical structure
Lets now focus on the specic investment cost, h. An increase in h generates a
decline in the value at entry of manufacturers, and this leads to a higher nal good
price, lower output (thus lower consumer surplus), and a higher exit rate (Table 7).
As the cost of becoming linked is higher, relative to becoming vertically integrated,
the ratio VI to L rises.
Despite the increase in the exit rate, there is a decline in TFP. The lower TFP
level is caused by a decrease in the TFP of suppliers. Given that small and medium
sized manufacturers use links more intensively relative to VI, the increase in h
has a big impact on this group of rms. In addition, as small and medium sized
manufacturers are more selective in the " they choose to invest in, this leads to lower
RTFP of suppliers (from 1.8 to 1.6). In line with this reasoning, it can be seen that
some rms that invested in L, now do not invest at all, and some other ones invest
in VI, as shown by the increase in the percentage of median-sized rms that invest
in VI from 0:052 to 0:064. As a result, even though there is higher selection, TFP
Welfare =
Q
1+
1 + 
  pQ +
X
z
X
"
h
Um(z; ")
U (z; ") + Lm(z; ")
L(z; ")
+V Im (z; ")
V I(z; ") + Us (z; ")
U (z; ") + Ls (z; ")
L(z; ")
i
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decreases, producer surplus decreases and total welfare decreases.
Table 7: Changes in specic investment and VI xed costs:
h 
1:3 1:4 1:5 3:15 3:25 3:35
Price 1:00 1:01 1:03 1:00 1:00 1:00
Exit rate 0:086 0:091 0:091 0:086 0:090 0:09
Agg. Output 100:0 98:9 97:9 100:0 100:0 100:0
TFP 100:0 99:1 97:6 100:0 101:4 101:4
Welfare 100:0 97:5 95:1 100:0 100:0 100:0
Consumer surplus 100:0 97:7 95:4 100:0 100:0 100:0
Producer surplus 100:0 91:9 84:2 100:0 99:9 99:6
Share of Vertically Integrated Firms
V I
Total F irms
0:084 0:090 0:096 0:084 0:062 0:060
V I
L
0:328 0:427 0:589 0:328 0:251 0:242
When the additional managerial xed cost of a vertically integrated manufacturer
() increases, the share of vertically integrated rms, as well as the ratio of vertically
integrated to linked rms, decreases (Table 7). Furthermore, the increase in the xed
cost of a vertically integrated rm does not seem to have an e¤ect on the value at
entry of manufacturers, because the possibility to become a big vertically integrated
rm is strongly discounted upon entry. Therefore, the equilibrium price remain
the same as before (so does the consumer surplus), but the exit rate increases. In
addition, the TFP increases a bit while producer surplus slightly decreases. Thus
there is no e¤ect on total welfare.
Complementarity and vertical structure
When T1 increases, it increases the complementarity between manufacturer and
suppliers type making the e¤ects of cost reducing investment more important, thus
the mass of rms that become vertically integrated and linked increases (Table 8).
The exit rate decreases and it is cheaper to invest and thus to survive. The larger
proportion of ine¢ cient rms o¤sets the original decline in costs, thus the TFP
decreases. Finally, total welfare increases.
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Table 8: Changes in complementarity.
T1 T2 
70 75 80  0:5 0 0:5 0:45 0:47 0:49
Price 1:02 1:00 0:97 1:06 1:00 0:838 1:00 1:00 0:99
Exit rate 0:090 0:086 0:086 0:093 0:086 0:072 0:090 0:086 0:088
Agg. Output 100:0 102:1 104:4 100:0 105:3 122:7 100:0 100:5 101:1
TFP 100:0 97:9 95:8 100:0 101:0 103:6 100:0 100:3 98:6
Welfare 100:0 104:8 109:9 100:0 112:6 158:1 100:0 101:3 102:4
Consumer surplus 100:0 104:8 110:0 100:0 112:2 157:1 100:0 101:2 102:4
Producer surplus 100:0 104:8 106:0 100:0 128:8 208:0 100:0 105:6 101:0
Share of VI
V I
Total F irms
0:058 0:084 0:103 0:047 0:084 0:107 0:077 0:084 0:104
V I
L
0:235 0:328 0:431 0:294 0:328 0:233 0:331 0:328 0:480
The increase in T2 generates an increase in the value at entry, which makes
the equilibrium nal good price and exit rate lower. When T1 increases, every
manufacturer increases VI and L with less e¢ cient suppliers. In contrast, when
T2 increases it is the least e¢ cient active manufacturers that were in the margin
of setting up links and becoming vertically integrated the ones that start playing
an important role in the total investment. As explained above, in Figure 5, these
groups of manufacturers are more selective with respect to the supplier they choose
to become vertically integrated or linked. They have to nd a very e¢ cient supplier
in order to do so. Thus, an increase in T2 generates an increase in TFP, in contrast
with what happens when T1 increases.19
The parameter  indicates how important is the manufacturers type, z, relative
to suppliers type, ", in the e¤ect of the cost reducing investment. If  increases it is
less important than before, in terms of reductions in variable cost, how e¢ cient is the
supplier. Thus, when  increases it makes manufacturers less selective on the type of
supplier they choose to invest in VI and L. As a result TFP decreases. In addition,
the share of vertically integrated to linked manufacturers increases. Moreover, as it
is easier to become more productive when linking or becoming vertically integrated
(it depends less on how e¢ cient the supplier is), the value at entry increases and
19The RTFP of suppliers increases from 1:6 to 2:2.
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the equilibrium price decreases. The decline in nal good price leads to an increase
in total production and consumer surplus. Finally, total welfare increases.
Discount factor and vertical structure
With respect to a change in the discount factor, as rms value more the future
they have more incentives to invest, thus the total investment in VI and L increases
(the measure of vertically integrated and linked rms rise), and the share of rms
using specialized inputs increases (Table 9). As the value at entry increases, the
equilibrium nal good price decreases and consumer surplus increases. Given that
there is less selection, in equilibrium there are more ine¢ cient rms active in the
industry, and TFP decreases. Furthermore, as the decrease in TFP does not seems
to have a big impact on aggregate protability, the total producer surplus increases
and, as a result, total welfare increases.
Table 9: Changes in discount factor.

0:95 0:96 0:97
Price 1:08 1:00 0:913
Exit Rate 0:090 0:086 0:083
Agg. Output 100:0 107:5 116:3
TFP 100:0 95:5 90:9
Welfare 100:0 117:0 138:7
Consumer surplus 100:0 117:3 139:6
Producer surplus 100:0 103:0 104:4
Share of Vertically Integrated Firms
V I
Total F irms
0:078 0:084 0:091
V I
L
0:342 0:328 0:341
Fixed entry and production costs and vertical structure
When manufacturers xed cost of production is higher, the equilibrium price in-
creases and consumer surplus decreases (Table 10). The exit rate increases, which
generates an increase in TFP. An increase in the xed cost of suppliers has similar
e¤ects. In both cases total welfare decreases.
The e¤ect of changes in entry costs of manufacturers and suppliers is as follows
(Table 10 and 11). When Cme increases, the equilibrium price increases and produc-
tion, as well as consumer surplus, decreases. The increase in price generates more
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investments in VI, in particular by small rms (the percentage of median sized man-
ufacturing plants that are vertically integrated increases). There is also a relative
increase in the share of big rms. This explains the rise in TFP. Although there is
an increase in TFP, producer surplus decreases due to the decline of entry and the
total mass of rms.
Table 10: Changes in xed costs and entry costs.
Cmf C
s
f C
m
e
0:35 0:40 0:45 0:35 0:40 0:45 2:5 3:0 3:5
Price 0:96 1:00 1:04 0:96 1:00 1:04 0:93 1:00 1:07
Exit rate 0:08 0:08 0:09 0:08 0:08 0:09 0:08 0:08 0:09
Agg. Output 100:0 96:77 93:28 100:0 96:77 93:28 100:0 94:06 88:40
TFP 100:0 102:13 102:41 100:0 95:04 89:45 100:0 105:32 108:18
Welfare 100:0 93:19 85:87 100:0 93:19 85:85 100:0 87:70 76:52
Consumer surplus 100:0 92:99 85:70 100:0 92:99 85:70 100:0 87:34 76:09
Producer surplus 100:0 102:81 93:71 100:0 102:81 92:74 100:0 106:46 98:93
Share of VI
V I
Total F irms
0:087 0:084 0:086 0:087 0:084 0:085 0:084 0:084 0:093
V I
L
0:219 0:257 0:220 0:219 0:257 0:217 0:223 0:257 0:210
A rise in the entry cost of suppliers induces an increase in the standardized input
price (from 0:42 to 0:46). Thus, there is an increase the exit rate of manufacturers
and in the nal good price which yields a decline in consumer surplus. The increase
in the standardized input price induces an increase in VI and a decline in L.
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Table 11: Changes in entry costs.
Cse
2:5 3:0 3:5
Price 0:97 1:00 1:025
Exit Rate 0:08 0:08 0:09
Agg. Output 100:0 97:85 95:80
TFP 100:0 101:48 101:30
Welfare 100:0 95:41 90:95
Consumer surplus 100:0 95:30 90:92
Producer surplus 100:0 100:20 92:36
Share of Vertically Integrated Firms
V I
Total F irms
0:084 0:084 0:093
V I
L
0:257 0:257 0:210
1.3.4 Idiosyncratic productivity shocks and vertical structure
In our framework we have three di¤erent types of manufacturer rms. First, an
unattached manufacturer, which has no variable costs advantage relative to verti-
cally integrated and linked rms. It is not subject to hold-up and has lower xed
costs relative with a vertically integrated rm. Thus it performs better when facing
negative shocks.
Second, a linked rm. It uses specialized inputs and is subject to a hold-up
problem. It performs better than a vertically integrated manufacturer rm when
negative shocks are realized (avoid higher xed costs and bound losses).
And third, a vertically integrated rm which has the lowest variable costs. It is
not subject to hold-up. In addition, it pays higher xed costs and requires higher
investment costs (h+PV I , which in equilibrium is much higher than h), then perform
worst (have larger losses) when facing negative shocks.
In this section we want to address the following question: what is the implication
of making the evolution of the manufacturers productivity shocks less persistent? In
table 12 we present the comparative statics results. It shows the e¤ect of decreasing
the persistence of shocks, ; on the vertical relation of the industry. By comparing
the rst column with the other ones, it can be seen that the share of vertically
integrated manufacturers to linked ones decreases, as well as the share of vertically
integrated manufacturers, while the mass of vertically integrated rms decreases
and the measure of linked ones increases. Moreover, the share of rms that invest
46
in using specialized inputs, (V I + L)=Total F irms, increases.
Because of cost reducing investment through VI are less attractive when there
is a decline in the persistence, manufacturers value at entry decreases. Hence the
equilibrium price increases. As a result, the equilibrium output decreases and con-
sumer surplus is lower. In addition, the increase in the nal good price generates a
lower exit rate. Despite the lower selection, there is an increase in producer surplus
and total factor productivity (TFP) due to the fact that e¢ cient manufacturers that
invest in the use of specialized inputs become more selective about supplierstype.
In other words, in order to invest in VI or L, manufacturers wait more until they get
matched with a better supplier. Thus suppliersproductivity increases.20 Finally,
as the decline in consumer surplus is bigger than the increase in producer surplus,
the total welfare decreases.
Table 12: Changes in persistence and variance of shocks.
 2
0:93 0:92 0:91 0:13 0:15 0:17
Price 1:00 1:08 1:11 0:90 1:0 0:99
Exit rate 0:09 0:06 0:06 0:05 0:086 0:092
Agg. Output 100:0 93:6 91:4 100:0 91:3 92:3
TFP 100:0 104:2 108:4 100:0 98:7 93:8
Welfare 100:0 86:8 82:9 100:0 81:2 82:5
Consumer surplus 100:0 86:5 81:9 100:0 81:9 83:9
Producer surplus 100:0 112:6 132:8 100:0 60:0 39:7
Share vertically integrated Firms
V I
Total F irms
0:084 0:062 0:059 0:130 0:084 0:041
V I
L
0:328 0:206 0:152 0:308 0:328 0:385
If  is high, rms anticipate that high shocks today will be around for long time.
Thus, by becoming vertically integrated, they strongly discount the realization of a
low shock (while paying high xed costs). Therefore, many rms decide to become
vertically integrated.
In contrast, if  is low, there is higher mobility across productivity states and the
expected duration of being in a high idiosyncratic e¢ ciency level is lower. There is
20Revenue TFP of suppliers increases signicantly, from 1.8 to 2.1, while the RTFP of manufacturers
does not change.
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a higher possibility of having a low shock relatively soon, incurring high losses (due
to high xed production costs) or not recovering the investment cost (h+ PV I). As
a result, manufacturers become more exible, which is reected by a lower VI to L
ratio and a decrease in the share of vertically integrated rms.
To summarize, as found in Kranton and Minehart (2000), our result indicates
that the properties of the idiosyncratic risk at rm level plays an important role in
determining the vertical structure of rms. The choice of manufacturers between
VI and link is nontrivial. It follows from the trade-o¤ between loosing exibility
against negative shocks and sharing a fraction of prots with the supplier.
As the variance 2 increases, given that the per period prot is concave in z, the
value at entry is lower. Hence the equilibrium price increases and consumer surplus
shows a large decline. A higher dispersion in productivity shocks implies that there
are entrants with e¢ ciency levels within a wider range of values. The most ine¢ cient
ones exit while the most e¢ cient ones survive (each one of which contributes more
to total production than before). Thus, there are two forces that diminishes the
total number of rms. First, the higher equilibrium prices generates a decline in
demand, and therefore there is less space for production units in the market. And
second, there are bigger production units that satisfy the lower quantity demanded.
What is interesting here is that, even though there is a reallocation of resources from
small to medium and big rms (looking at the size distribution of rms, there is an
increase in the share of big rms and a decline in the share of small ones), which
increases the RTFP of manufacturers, the big decline in total investment (the share,
as well as the mass, of rms that become vertically integrated and linked decreases)
generates lower suppliers RTFP. As a result, the total RTFP (and TFP) decreases.
In line with this, producer surplus is lower, hence total welfare decreases.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper proposes a dynamic entry and exit model of an industry with vertical
structure decisions and specic investments. In the model, the industrial verti-
cal structure is the result of optimal investment decisions that rms make under
uncertainty. The model does well in replicating new facts on vertical structures
documented in Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009) and Kranton and Minehart (2000).
Our results indicate that di¤erences in vertical structures across industries, and
across rms within industries, are the result of di¤erences in the properties of the
stochastic process governing the uncertainty at rm level, in specic investment
costs, in bargaining power of manufacturers and suppliers, and in complementarity
of manufacturersand suppliersproductivity.
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1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Stationary Equilibrium
Because there is a continuum of rms that are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, there
is a cross sectional distribution of rms over the states (z; ") and over di¤erent ver-
tical structures. We call U the stationary distribution of downstream unattached
rms, and V I , L, U and L the stationary distribution of vertically integrated
manufacturers, linked manufacturers, unattached suppliers and specialized suppli-
ers, respectively. Let0s dene D(p) as the aggregate demand, that is continuous and
strictly decreasing. Then, the stationary equilibrium is standard:
A stationary equilibrium in this model is a list of value functions for manufac-
turers and suppliers (V U(z; "); V L(z; "); V V I(z; "); WU(z; "); WL(z; "); V me (p; ps);
W se (p; ps)), policy functions (aU(z; "), x
0
U(z; "); aL(z; "); aV I(z; "); x
0
V I(z; ")), prices
p and ps and price functions pLs (z; ") and PV I(z; "), invariant measures for down-
stream standardized rms U , vertically integrated rms V I and linked rms L
and invariant measures for upstream unattached rms U and upstream linked rms
L, an invariant density Jm(z), a mass of downstream and upstream entrants m
and s, a threshold z and a threshold function b"(z), given the aggregate demand
function for nal goods D(p) such that:
i) Input prices pLs (z; ") and acquisition prices pV I(z; ") are given by NBS
ii) Given p; ps; pLs (z; ") and PV I(z; "), policy functions aU(z; "), aV I(z; ") and
aL(z; ") solve the static input decisions
iii) Given p; ps; pLs (z; ") and PV I(z; "), policy functions x
0
U(z; ") and x
0
V I(z; ") solve
the dynamic decisions of rms
iv) Free entry conditions are satised for manufacturers
Cme = V
m
e (p; ps) =
X
"
X
z
V U(z; ")gm(z)gs("); (1.15)
and for suppliers
Cse = W
s
e (ps; p) =
X
"
X
z
WU(z; ")Jm(z)gs("): (1.16)
v) Market clearing conditions are satised in the market for nal goods D(p) =
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S(p) and in the market for standardized inputs Ds(ps) = Ss(ps) where
S(p) =
P
z
P
"
zaU(z; ")
U(z; ") +
P
z
P
"
zaV I(z; ")
V I(z; ")
+
P
z
P
"
zaL(z; ")
L(z; "):
(1.17)
vi) Laws of motion of states are consistent with individual decisions (stationary
measures U ,V I ,L,U and L are xed points). As mentioned before the
heterogeneity of a market rm is described by U(B) measure on (S;B); where
S = Z  E and Bs = all possible subsets of S, and BBs: Then we have the
following xed point of the form U = T (U ; m):
U(B) =
snX
z
snX
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ")| {z }
Element of the Markov chain
I(x0U (z;")=U)| {z }
Indicator function from policy functions
U(z; ")
| {z }
Incumbent who survive
+
snX
z
snX
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") I(x0V I(z;")=U)V I(z; ")| {z }
Vertically Integrated Incumbent who survive
+
snX
z
snX
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") I(x0L(z;")=U)L(z; ")| {z }
Linked Incumbent who survive
8BBs:
snX
z
snX
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ")| {z }
Element of the Markov chain
I(x0U (z;")=U)| {z }
Indicator function from policy functions
mgm(z)gs("))
| {z }
Entrants
(1.18)
In a similar way, the heterogeneity of incumbent downstream rms that are
vertically integrated and linked is described by V I(B) measure on (S;B) and
L(B) measure on (S;B): Then we have V I = T V I(V I) and L = TL(L):
V I(B) =
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") I(x0U (z;")=V I)U(z; ")
+
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") I(x0V I(z;")=V I)V I(z; ")
+
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") I(x0L(z;")=V I)L(z; ") 8BBs:
(1.19)
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And nally, we have the following xed point for the measures of linked rms
L(B) =
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") I(x0U (z;")=L)U(z; ")
+
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") I(x0V I(z;")=L)V I(z; ")
+
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") I(x0L(z;")=L)L(z; ") 8BBs:
(1.20)
vii) The mass of suppliers, s, equal the mass of unattached and linked manufac-
turers
U + L =
X
z
X
"
U(z; ") +
X
z
X
"
L(z; ")
1.5.2 Solution Method
The algorithm to compute the equilibrium is as follows:
1) Given initial guesses for the price of the nal good, p0; and for the standardized
input price, p0s, compute the price for the specialized input, p
L0
s (z; "); by NBS
over current prots, that is, taking
pL0s = ps   (1  )c(z; ");
as the solution of expression (8), and take PV I as
ps Cmf
1  +h. Take these prices
as the initial guesses for pL0s and P
0
V I
2) Take an initial guess for the density of productivity of manufacturers looking
for a standardized suppliers Jm0 (z),
3) Obtain policy functions aU(); x0U(); aL(); aV I(); x0V I() and value functions
; V U(); V V I(); V L(); WU() and WL() (equations 1; 2; 4; 5, and 6).
4) Compute the price for the specialized input, pLs (z; ") by NBS taking into ac-
count the continuation values (equation 8) and PV I(z; ") = Ez0;"0WU(z0; "0).
5) Compare pLs (z; ) and PV I(z; ") with previous guesses p
L0
s (z; ) and P
0
V I(z; "):
i) If they are close)guess a new specialized input price, taking:
pL0s (z; ) = p
L0
s (z; ") + (p
L
s (z; ")  pL0s (z; ")); and
P 0V I(z; ") = P
0
V I(z; ") + (PV I(z; ")  P 0V I(z; "));
where  is a convergence tolerance parameter, and repeat from point (3):
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ii) If they are close)compute for each price pLs (z; ") and pV I(z; ") the gains
from trade for manufacturers and suppliers that trade inputs:
 If for some (z; ") gains from trade are negative)use an indicator so
that under these prices the manufacturer decides not to negotiate, and
repeat from point (3) using these new prices.
 If for every (z; ") gains from trade are positive)stop and go to next
point.
6) Use the computed decision rules and the transition matrix to compute the
invariant density of productivity of manufacturers looking for unattached sup-
pliers Jm(z), and compare it with Jm0 (z) :
i) If they are not close)guess a new one (Jm0 (z) = Jm(z)) and repeat from
point (2) until they get close.
ii) If they are close)stop and go to next point .
7) Compute V me (ps; p) and W
s
e (ps; p) and given the entry costs C
m
e and C
s
e verify
if free entry conditions (equations 10 and 11) hold:
i) If they do not hold:
 If V me (p; ps) < Cme and/or W se (ps) < Cse ) guess a new higher prices,
p and ps by bisection and repeat from point (1):
 If V me (p; ps) > Cme and/or W se (ps) > Cse ) guess a new lower prices,
p and ps by bisection and repeat from point (1):
ii) If V me (p; ps)  Cme and W se (ps)  Cse )stop and go to next point.
8) Use the computed decision rules and the transition matrix to compute the xed
points of the distribution of manufacturer rm sizes when the mass of rms is
one (m = 1). Thus, we have the xed points bU ; bV I and bL:
9) Use the linear homogeneity of the T 0s operators (dened in point vi of the
stationary equilibrium denition) in m to obtain the equilibrium value for m
that satises the market clearing condition for the nal good: D(p) = S(p; m):
1.5.3 Physical and revenue TFP
In this section I describe how the physical and revenue total factor productivity is
calculated. We denote physical and revenue total factor productivity as TFP and
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RTFP, respectively. The expression for the revenue TFP is as follows:
RTFP =
X
z
X
"
aU(z; ")
pz
ps+Cmf
eU(z; ") +X
z
X
"
aL(z; ")
pz+c(z;")
pLs (z;")+C
m
f
eL(z; ")
+
X
z
X
"
aV I(z; ")
pz+c(z;")
Cmf +C
V I
f
eV I(z; ") +X
z
X
"
ps
Csf
eU(z; ")
+
X
z
X
"
pLs (z;")
Csf
eL(z; ");
where the rst term represents the weighted average (the weight is the share of
unattached manufacturers in each state, eU(z; ")) of the ratio of standardized man-
ufacturers revenues, pz, to their total production cost, ps + Cmf .
The second and third terms are the weighted average of the ratio of linked and
vertically integrated manufacturers revenues to their corresponding total produc-
tion costs. In these cases eL(z; ") and eV I(z; ") are the share of linked and vertically
integrated manufacturers, respectively. In contrast with the rst term, in the nu-
merator it appears the variable cost advantage of specic investments, c(z; "). The
other di¤erence is in the denominator, where it appears as cost of the linked rms
the bargained input price pLs (z; "); and for vertically integrated rms the additional
xed cost CV If .
The last two terms correspond to the RTFP of suppliers. There, eU(z; ") andeL(z; ") are the share of unattached and linked suppliers, respectively. The fourth
term is the RTFP of a standardized supplier, which is the ratio of revenue, ps, to
total cost, Csf . For specialized suppliers, the RTFP is similar, but their revenue is
pLs (z,").
The expression for TFP is as follows
TFP =
X
z
X
"
aU(z; ")
z
1+
Cm
f
p
eU(z; ") +X
z
X
"
aL(z; ")
z+
c(z;")
p
1+
Cm
f
p
eL(z; ")
+
X
z
X
"
aV I(z; ")
z+
c(z;")
p
Cm
f
+CV I
f
p
eV I(z; ") +X
z
X
"
1
Cs
f
p
eU(z; ")
+
X
z
X
"
1
Cs
f
p
eL(z; ");
in which the di¤erence with the denition for RTFP is the following. For manu-
facturers, every term reects the ratio of units produced by each rm to the units
of all inputs they use in production. Unattached and linked manufacturers use one
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unit of input to produce and
Cmf
p
xed units of physical resources to produce z and
z+ c(z;")
p
units of nal goods, respectively. Every vertically integrated rm produces
z + c(z;")
p
units of nal goods and uses
Cmf +C
V I
f
p
xed units of physical resources to
produce. The logic is the same for suppliers.
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Chapter 2
Dual Employment Protection Legislation and the Size
Distribution of Firms (joint with Andrés Erosa)
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop a new theory in which dual employment protection legisla-
tion (DEPL) have non trivial e¤ects on the size distribution of rms and aggregate
total factor productivity (TFP) by distorting rm selection and the resource allo-
cation among rms. Our theory is motivated by three observations: 1) there exist
evidence showing that di¤erences in the size distribution of rms across countries
is important to account for di¤erences in aggregate productivity across countries;
2) there is evidence documenting that strict DEPL tended to be associated with a
higher share of temporary employment across countries and lower productivity; and
3) we present data indicating that countries with particularly high fraction of tem-
porary employment have a relatively large share of employment allocated in small
rms.
We develop a theory of rm dynamics with search frictions and asymmetric ring
costs of permanent and temporary workers in order to study the e¤ect of dual em-
ployment protection legislation on the size distribution of rms and aggregate TFP.
In the model economy, from a rms perspective, DEPL puts in place two di¤erent
workers. Temporary workers that remain matched with a rm for a short period
of time (they have an exogenous separation rate equal to one) and are dismissed
at zero ring cost; and permanent workers that remain matched with a rm until
it decides to re them (they have an exogenous separation rate equal to zero), but
have high ring costs. In this framework rms try to balance the higher frequency
of search cost expenditures associated to temporary workers with higher ring costs
associated to permanent workers, and this trade-o¤ determines the optimal compo-
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sition of rmslabor force over their life cycle. From one hand, rms that expect
their productivity to growth and therefore survive and last longer in the market
have incentives to hire more permanent workers. From the other hand, rms with
bad prospects on the evolution of their productivity have incentives to hire more
temporary workers since they keep reducing production and employment over time
and exit the industry relatively soon. In this context, an increase in the ring
costs of permanent workers distorts the optimal employment composition that rms
choose over their life-cycle penalizing relatively more to rms with high productivity
growth. Hence, an increase in ring costs of permanent workers reduces the mass
of businesses hiring permanent workers. In addition there are general equilibrium
e¤ects that reinforces this result. First, on the intensive margin, an increase in
the ring costs of permanent workers reduces prots of high productivity growth
rms inducing to less vacancy posting and reducing the labor market tightness. In
turn, this increases the probability that a rm matches with a worker making low
productivity rms to expand. Second, an increase in the ring costs of permanent
workers subsidizes rms with low productivity growth by reducing the costs of ll-
ing up temporary jobs which distorts the exit decision of rms. As a result, low
productivity growth rms last longer in the market and the age of shutdown of high
productivity growth rms decreases. Adding up, larger ring costs for permanent
contracts shifts employment from high productivity growth rms, which contract
and last shorter in the market, to rms with low productivity growth, which expand
and last longer in the market.
Our paper is closely related to the large literature on labor market regulations and
rm dynamics.1 ;2 Most papers studying the e¤ects of separation taxes have focused
on the analysis of unemployment and worker turnover. However, our contribution is
to show that DEPL has nontrivial e¤ects on the size distribution of rms and TFP.
In addition, the literature has emphasized positive e¤ects of temporary contracts
since they provide rms considerable exibility in the hiring and ring process.3
1Regarding the literature focusing on di¤erences in labor market regulations and their outcomes across
countries, see for example Blanchard and Summers (1986), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Layard, Nickell,
and Jackman (1991), Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), Machin and Manning (1999), and Freeman (2007).
2Regarding the literature focusing on separation taxes, see for example Bentolila and Bertola (1990),
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Millard and Mortensen (1997), Güell (2000), among others. Regarding
the extensive literature studying the e¤ects of temporary contracts, see for example Bentolila and Saint Paul
(1992), Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997), Blanchard and Landier (2002), Nagypal (2002), Aguiregabiria
and Alonso-Borrego (2004), Alonso-Borrego et al. (2005), Veracierto (2007), and Alvarez and Veracierto
(2012).
3For instance, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2009) develops a dynamic structural models of labor
demand to analyze longitudinal Spanish rm-level data during the period 1982-1993 (before and after the
reform), and their results indicate an important positive e¤ects on total employment and job turnover,
and small e¤ects on labor productivity and the value of rms. Within the papers studying the e¤ects of
temporary contracts the paper by Alonso-Borrego et al. (2005) and Alvarez and Veracierto (2012) are
probably the most closely related to our paper since, in contrast with the other papers, they consider rm
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However, another contribution of our paper is to show that there are also negative
e¤ects of higher exibility. Our model shows a mechanism through which higher
exibility in the hiring and ring process distorts the equilibrium selection of rms
and the allocation of resources among rms.
Of course, there is an empirical literature analyzing employment protection leg-
islation and showing that DEPL is widely used across countries and it has potential
e¤ects on employment (and unemployment), worker turnover and productivity.4 ;5
Regarding employment protection legislation Autor et al. (2007) and Bassanini et
al. (2008) provide empirical evidence showing that strict employment protection
legislation has a depressing impact on productivity because it reduces the level of
risk that rms are ready to endure in experimenting with new technologies or be-
cause there is less threat of layo¤ in response to poor work performance. With
regards to the e¤ect of DEPL on productivity, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), Sanchez
and Toharia (2000), and Alonso-Borrego (2010) nd a negative relationship between
the share of temporary workers and rmslabour productivity. Dolado and Stucchi
(2008) suggest that workers on temporary contracts may be motivated to exert low
e¤ort levels because of the high probability of being red at the end of their con-
tracts. They attribute one-third of the fall of TFP in Spanish manufacturing rms
during the period 20012005 to the disincentive e¤ects of the low conversion rates
on temporary workerse¤ort.6 Our paper provides a new mechanism to interpret
the negative e¤ect of DEPL on TFP documented in these papers.
There is an important recent macroeconomic literature analyzing the sources of
resource misallocation among production units. For instance, Erosa and Hidalgo
(2008) and Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) focus on nancial market imperfec-
tions as a source of misallocation. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) study the impact of
misallocation across establishments in explaining productivity in manufacturing in
dynamics in a general equilibrium model. However, Alonso-Borrego et al. (2005) nd that temporary
contracts increase productivity. In the paper by Alvarez and Veracierto (2012) the main argument is that
the presence of temporary contracts provides an employment bu¤er that rms can use to adjust to their
idiosyncratic shocks without having to incur ring costs.
4Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden have introduced
or intensied the use of temporary contracts since the mid 80s (European Commision, 2010).
5Some papers use longitudinal data of countries exploiting the di¤erences in severance pay across coun-
tries. For instance, Lazear (1990), Addison and Grosso (1996), Burgess, Knetter and Michelacci (2000),
Heckman and Pagés (2004), Abraham and Houseman (1993, 1994), Bover, García-Perea and Portugal
(2000), among others. While a second line of research has exploited data before and after specic re-
forms in the labor market using a di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach. See for example Kugler (2004), Hunt
(2000), and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), among others. For the e¤ects on employment and worker
turnover see, the surveys by Dolado, García-Serrano and Jimeno (2002) and by Bentolilla, Dolado and
Jimeno (2008) on the Spanish experience and the extensive literature cited therein.
6Dolado, Ortigueira and Stucchi (2012) propose a model in which both temporary workerse¤ort and
rmstemp-to-perm conversion rates decrease when the gap in ring costs between permanent and tempo-
rary workers increases. In addition, they test the implications of the model using as natural experiments
some labour market reforms entailing substantial changes in ring costs gap and they nd that reforms
leading to a lower gap enhanced conversion rates and increased rmsTFP.
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China and India. Furthermore, they recover the underlying distortions from ob-
served allocations and, as well as Bertelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2008),
follow Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and model distortions as rm or plant-specic.
Moreover, a key insight in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) is that idiosyncratic dis-
tortions are more important (have the potential to do much more damage) when
they are positively correlated with rm productivity (establishments with low TFP
receive a subsidy and establishments with high TFP are taxed). In our model, ring
costs to permanent workers act as a subsidy to small rms (which are intensive in
the use of temporary workers) and a tax to big rms (which are intensive in the use
of permanent workers). In this sense, our paper is related to Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008). In addition, Guner, Ventura and Xu (2008) consider policies that directly
target the size of the establishment (size-dependent policies) such as a tax on estab-
lishments with more than given number of employees. When a general conguration
of these policies are restricted to achieve a given reduction in average establishment
size, they nd a substantial reduction in aggregate output per worker. In line with
this idea, our paper shows that DEPL plays similar role as a size-dependent policy,
penalizing more to rms that use permanent employees (big rms).
To summarize, we provide evidence showing that countries with dual employ-
ment protection legislation that incentives or extend the use of temporary contracts
have relatively more employment concentrated in small rms and thus have lower
productivity. Motivated by the evidence, we next develop a theoretical model of rm
dynamics with search frictions and asymmetric ring costs for temporary and per-
manent workers and characterize the equilibrium labor composition that rms with
di¤erent productivity growth rate choose over their life cycle. In this framework we
analyze the impact of higher ring costs of permanent workers in the distribution
of rmssize and productivity.
2.1.1 Empirical evidence
In order to motivate our theory, in this section we bring along evidence showing
that it is important to analyze the size distribution of rms to understand di¤erences
in productivity across countries. We also show that, across countries, DEPL tends
to be associated with a higher share of temporary employment, and that countries
with particularly high fraction of temporary employment have a relatively large
share of small rms as well as a high share of employment allocated in small rms
and lower aggregate productivity.
Taking data from the OECD, Compendium of Productivity (2005), in the panel
to the left of Figure 1 we present the normalized rmss labor productivity by size-
classes (employment bins) in the manufacturing sector for US and many European
58
countries.7 The panel to the right of Figure 1 presents the aggregate labor produc-
tivity for the same group of countries.8 Despite countries di¤er signicantly in their
aggregate labor productivity, across countries rms display similar labor produc-
tivity levels within the same size-classes. The biggest enterprise size class has the
highest productivity. This is a common pattern in Europe since for the majority of
countries, about 75 % (taking into account other European economies not presented
here), productivity increases monotonically with size class.
Figure 1: Normalized Productivity (manufacturing sector), 2005.
How can signicant di¤erences in aggregate labor productivity across countries
be reconciled with the fact that rms display similar labor productivity levels within
the same size-classes across countries? The data exposed in Figure 2 and Table 1
suggests that one possible reason is that the distribution of rm sizes is di¤erent
across counties. In Figure 2, panel A presents the cumulative fraction of rms for
di¤erent employment levels comparing three economies, US, UK and Spain; and
Table 1 shows the size distribution of rms and the labor productivity. It is clear
that in Europe there is a higher concentration of rms in low size levels, measured
by employment, than in US. While 0.12% of rms in Spain and 0.16% of rms in
UK have more than 500 employees, in US a fraction of 0.31% of rms belong to that
employment size-class. Furthermore, the fraction of rms with 100 to 499 and 20
to 99 employees is 0.75% and 4.67% in Spain, 1.31% and 7.44% in UK, and 1.52%
and 8.88% in US, respectively. In addition, Spain and UK have a higher fraction of
7The normalised labour productivity is calculated as value added per worker in a given size class
as a percentage of the average labour productivity across all size classes (see OECD, Compendium of
Productivity 2005).
8The Labor productivity in the panel to the right of Figure 1 is Gross Domestic Product at constant
prices and using PPPs, divided by either total employment or total hours worked.
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rms in the lowest employment level, 94.46% and 91.10% in the 1 to 9 workers bin,
respectively, than US (with 89.29%).
Panel B of Figure 2 presents a similar comparison among many other European
countries. For instance, France, Italy and Spain have a higher fraction of micro
and small rms and a lower fraction of medium and large rms than the average
among European Countries. In contrast, Germany, UK and Netherlands have a
lower fraction of micro and small rms and a higher fraction of medium and large
rms than the average among European Countries.
Table 2 shows that the same pattern occurs when comparing the fraction of
total employment concentrated in di¤erent rm size classes. For instance, in Spain
small rms concentrate a bigger fraction of total employment than the average small
rms in the EU. In Spain the joint employment of micro, small and medium rms
represents 82.2%, versus 73.9% in the EU. In contrast, small rms in the UK employ
a lower fraction of total employment with respect to the average small rms in the
EU (62.87% versus 73.9%). The opposite evidence is found when we look at the
fraction of employment at big rms. In Spain and the UK big rms concentrates
17.8% and 37.2% of total employment, respectively.
Figure 2: Fraction of rm by size-classes (manufacturing sector), 2008.
Panel A Panel B
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Table 1: Firms size distribution and productivity.
Country Employment-Size Classes (% of rms) Productivity (EU-27=1)
Micro Small Medium Large Value added per worker
Poland 95.5 3.3 1.0 0.2 0.44
Italy 94.3 5.1 0.5 0.1 0.93
Portugal 94.0 5.1 0.7 0.1 0.48
France 93.3 5.6 0.9 0.2 1.19
Spain 93.1 6.0 0.8 0.1 1.04
Netherlands 90.4 8.0 1.4 0.3 1.18
Luxembourg 84.0 12.9 2.4 0.3 2.96
UK 89.3 8.8 2.5 0.4 1.31
Germany 83.0 14.1 2.4 0.5 1.26
EU-27 92.0 6.7 1.1 0.2 1.00
Source: Taken from Eurostat 2009
Large: 250 or more, medium-sized: 50-249, small: 10-49, and micro: <10
Table 2: Employment by rms sizes.
Country Employment-Size Classes (% of rms)
Micro Small Medium Large
Poland . . . .
Italy 61.3 15.8 9.1 13.9
Portugal 57.7 17.1 11.9 13.3
France 35.9 17.7 13.8 32.6
Spain 49.6 20.6 12.0 17.8
Netherlands 41.1 17.8 13.9 27.2
Luxembourg 24.7 22.3 21.9 21.1
UK 35.3 14.8 12.7 37.2
Germany 32.6 18.2 16.2 33.0
EU-27 43.8 16.5 13.5 26.1
Source: Taken from Eurostat 2009
Large: 250 or more, medium-sized: 50-249, small: 10-49, and micro: <10
All this evidence suggests that is important to study the determinants of the size
distribution of rms to interpret the di¤erences in relative aggregate productivity.
In line with this fact, there are other papers showing that in order to understand the
cross country di¤erences of economiesperformance in many dimensions it is relevant
to study the size distribution of rms. For instance, Navaretti, et al (2011), in the
second EFIGE policy report, nd that European countries perform very di¤erently
in terms of their trade competitiveness (exports and global production strategies)
because the within-country distribution of rms characteristics (size, innovative ca-
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pacity and productivity) di¤er signicantly across these economies.9
As mentioned before, the growing literature studying the sources of resource
misallocation among production units focuses on many reasons to interpret the dif-
ferences in the size distribution of rms across countries. We next show additional
evidence indicating that countries with particularly high fraction of temporary con-
tracts in their labor force have a relatively large share of small rms and lower pro-
ductivity, suggesting that labor market regulations that stimulate rms to extend
the use of temporary may play an important role in shaping the size distribution of
rms.
Fixed-term contracts are relatively common in some countries such as Poland and
Spain, where 25% or more of employees have such a contract, and Portugal with
more than 20% in 2009 (see Figure 3). In contrast, temporary contracts accounts
for less than 15% of employees in Germany, and just a bit more than 5% of employ-
ees in Luxembourg and UK. Following Boeri (2010b), the 2010 Eurostat Report on
Employment in Europe (Figure 4) shows that stricter employment protection legis-
lation (EPL) for permanent contracts tended to be associated with a higher share
of temporary employment across EU countries (rms substitute permanent workers
9For instance, they nd that among European Union countries trade performance di¤er signicantly
where Germany is by far the most export oriented, with a share of exports to GDP of 39.9 percent, followed
by Italy (23.4 percent), France (21.3 percent), the United Kingdom(17.2 percent) and Spain (16.7 percent).
Then they show that German rms tend to be larger and Italian rms smaller than the EU average in all
sectors. Furthermore, using rm level microdata collected in 2008 they conduct a counterfactual exercise
suggesting that if the industrial structure (in terms of rm size and sectors) of countries such as Italy and
Spain were to converge to the structure of Germany, the value of Italian and Spanish total exports would
rise considerably, by 37 percent and 24 percent respectively.
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for temporary workers to avoid higher ring costs).
Figure 3: Fixed-term employment for Member States by gender, 2009.
Figure 4: EPL on permanent contracts and temporary work.
In the horizontal axis of Figure 5 I have ranked countries according to the share
of temporary work in decreasing order and the vertical axis contains the share of
big rms (indicating an important aspect of the shape of the size distribution of
rms) and the GDP per hour worked (an indicator of productivity). It provides
preliminary evidence showing that there is a negative relationship between the share
of temporary workers and the fraction of big rms as well as with the aggregate
productivity across countries. The same results are obtained when using value
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added per worker and the share of employment in big rms, respectively.
Figure 5: Temporary work and TFP.
The previous unconditional data analysis is in line with formal empirical ev-
idence on the relationship between DEPL (and temporary work) and the level of
TFP documented in other papers, and it represents preliminary evidence about the
relationship between temporary work and the size distribution of rms. In addition,
it is common knowledge that labor market regulations clearly distinguish the rst
three countries (in particular in Spain and Portugal) from the rest, and that dual
employment protection legislations in those countries have been at the center of the
economic debate. Regarding formal empirical evidence, in addition to the literature
discussed in the introduction, it is relevant the paper by Dolado, Ortigueira and
Stucchi (2012) since it is well known that Spain represents a key case study due to
the widespread use of temporary work and the relative strictness of DEPL. Dolado,
Ortigueira and Stucchi (2012) argue that since the early nineties Spain has been the
EU country with the highest proportion of temporary workers and, in parallel, it has
su¤ered from a drastic productivity slowdown since the mid-1990s. Using a panel of
Spanish manufacturing rms they estimate that up to 20% of the slowdown of TFP
growth in Spanish manufacturing rms could be explained by the reduction in con-
version rates that dual employment protection legislation generates. It is also well
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known that the lower TPF level that Spain has relative to other European countries
is connected with the lower fraction of large rms (or lower share of employees in
big rms).10
All in all, the unconditional analysis documented in the current paper suggests
that countries with labor market regulations that disincentive the relative use of per-
manent contracts have a higher fraction of temporary work, and a higher fraction of
temporary work is associated with a lower fraction of large rms and lower produc-
tivity. In addition, there is well documented microevidence for the Spanish economy
that points to the dual employment protection legislation as a key determinant for
the lower productivity. In the current paper we explore a new specic mechanism
linking changes in the strictness of the dual employment protection legislation to
aggregate productivity by means of distortions on rm selection and the allocation
of resources across rms.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Key features of the model
In this section we describe the main ingredients of the model, introduce some
notation, and explain the induced optimal behavior by agents and the main trade-
o¤s before going to the model more in detail. We develop a theory of rm dynamics
with search frictions and asymmetric ring costs of permanent and temporary work-
ers. Lets now explain each of these components.
First, by rm dynamics we mean the following. There is a continuum of potential
entrant rms that upon entry have the same initial productivity and draw a rate
of productivity growth, g; from a distribution with cdf G(g). Firms live at most
J^ periods, they produce homogeneous goods that are sold in a competitive market
and for production they need to employ workers.
Second, regarding the presence of search frictions, just like in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), we assume that rms and workers have to search for each other and
there is a matching technology that relates the probability of workers and employers
nding a counterpart in the labor market to the ratio of vacancies to unemployed
members of the labor force, denoted by . Due to the linear homogeneity of the
matching function,m(), job seekers meet rms at the rate m() which is increasing
in . Following Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2011), the cost of posting vacancies
is proportional to a function cv, so that recruiting x workers entails spending cvx,
where cv is the cost of a vacancy divided by the probability of lling the vacancy,
10See FEDEA (2009), and Pol Antras in NeG (2010), http://www.fedeablogs.net/economia/?p=7234.
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cv = c=m(). Whereas marginal recruitment costs are increasing at the aggregate
level because of congestion externalities, they are exogenous from a rms point of
view. In addition, we assume that there are unemployment benets, denoted by b.
Third, regarding temporary and permanent workers and the asymmetric ring
costs we assume that, temporary workers are employees that remain matched with a
rm for a short period of time (they have an exogenous separation rate equal to one)
and are dismissed at zero ring cost. Permanent workers are employees that remain
matched with a rm until it decides to re them (they have an exogenous separation
rate equal to zero), but have high ring costs,  f . In addition we allow permanent
workers to have exogenous higher productivity than temporary ones (this is not a
fundamental assumption; the results remain the same if we assume that temporary
and permanent workers have similar exogenous productivity).
With respect to the timing, after entry a rm observes its productivity growth
rate, it decides the optimal age to exit, and decides how many vacancies to post.
After matches have taken place, it decides how many workers to hire as temporary
or permanent workers. Then rms and workers bargain over wages according to
their particular labor contracts (permanent or transitory contracts). There is free
entry, thus new rms are born (enter) every period.
In this framework rms try to balance the higher frequency of search cost ex-
penditures associated to temporary workers with higher ring costs associated to
permanent workers, and this trade-o¤ determines the optimal composition of rms
labor force over their life cycle. Furthermore, rms with the same productivity level
may choose di¤erent optimal sizes and fraction of permanent and temporary work-
ers. In order to provide a better interpretation on this optimal rms´ behavior, lets
focus on an example in discrete time to analyze the optimal decisions of rms with
high productivity growth rate and rms with low productivity growth rate. Lets
assume that every rm begins its life with the same productivity level, according
to which its optimal size is ten workers. In addition, lets assume that permanent
workers are equally productive than temporary workers.
First, lets assume that for a rm with the highest productivity growth rate its
optimal employment sequence is {10; 15; 20; 25; 30; 35} and thus it lives for bJ = 6
periods. Therefore, if the rm only hires permanent workers then the total cost over
the life cycle, net of wages, is 35(cv+ f ), where 35cv is the total search cost and 35 f
is the total ring cost incurred when the rm exit the market. Alternatively, in case
the rm decides to hire only temporary workers the net total cost is 135cv. Notice
that the total search costs in the rst case is much lower than in the second case
and it may compensate the higher ring costs the rm pay when hiring permanent
workers. Therefore, rms with positive growth rate, which survive and last longer
in the market, have incentives to hire permanent workers.
66
Focusing just on the rst ten workers that the rm hires right after entry, it
can be seen that under a permanent labor contract the costs over the life cycle
is 10(cv +  f ) versus bJ10cv if the rm employs ten workers under a temporary
labor contract. Therefore, it is convenient for the rm to use permanent workers
whenever  f < ( bJ   1)cv. If we now focus on the second period that the rm is
active in the market, and assuming that it has hired ten permanent workers in the
previous period, under the same reasoning it hires ve additional permanent workers
if  f < (J 2)cv. Notice that the left hand side of the previous inequality is constant
while the right hand side decreases as rm ages. Therefore, the value of a permanent
worker decreases as the horizon of the contractual relationship diminishes. Moreover,
rms optimally modify the fraction of permanent workers they hire over their life
cycle.
Second, lets focus on a rm with negative productivity growth rate. This exam-
ple shows that rms with bad prospects on the evolution of their productivity have
incentives to hire more temporary workers since they keep reducing production and
employment over time and exit the industry relatively soon. Lets assume that a
rms optimal employment path is a sequence of workers f10; 5; 2g and exit after
J = 2 periods. Following the same reasoning as in the previous example its easy to
notice that; rst, it is not optimal for this rm to employ only permanent workers
(since some of them will be red next period); and second, it may be optimal for the
rm to employ some permanent workers, for instance 3 permanent workers and 7
temporary workers in the rst period, 2 temporary workers in the second period, re
one permanent worker in the third period, and then exit. Therefore, even rms with
negative productivity growth rate may nd it optimal to hire permanent workers to
save on search costs and modify the fraction of temporary and permanent workers
along their life-cycle.
The model generates a cross sectional distribution of rms by size and employ-
ment composition (di¤erent share of temporary and permanent workers). Further-
more, this environment gives rise to rich industry dynamics as rms enter, exit,
decide the composition of their labor force over their life cycle and bargain wages
for each type of labor contract. Despite the di¢ culty of the issue we develop a simple
model that is analytically tractable to show that high relative ring costs of perma-
nent workers distort rm selection and the allocation of resources across rms. But
the main mechanism and insights of the model apply to a more general and realistic
model. In the conclusion we argue that, under the presence of search frictions, as
long as it takes longer to high productivity rms to exit (they have longer expected
life span) and thus it is more valuable for them to hire permanent workers, a more
realistic Hopenhayn and Rogersons (1992) style model capture similar behavior and
yields the same results as in the model developed in current paper. We will discuss
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further the evidence supporting this assumption in the conclusion of the paper.
2.2.2 Value functions for rms and workers
In this section we describe the model more in detail. As mentioned before, since
there is a continuum of ex-ante homogeneous rms that are ex-post heterogeneous,
there is a cross sectional distribution of rms over the states. As there is free entry
and exit and no aggregate uncertainty, by a law of large numbers all aggregate
quantities and prices are constant over time. Therefore, when describing the value
of rms, employed and unemployed workers we focus on the stationary equilibrium
and thus value functions are not indexed by time.
Firms
Firms produce goods according to the production function z(nT +nP ) where
z is the initial productivity level that we assume equal to one, nT and nP are the
number of temporary and permanent workers, respectively. The parameter  is the
span of control parameter ( < 1), and  is the relative productivity of permanent
workers. As mentioned before, rms sell their output in a competitive market, and
the price is normalized to 1.
We normalize the ring cost of a temporary worker to zero while the ring cost
of a permanent worker  f , measured in units of output, is positive. We also assume
that rms incur the cost  t (a training cost) when hiring a permanent worker. We
assume that rms pay the training cost when they hire permanent workers (this is
without loss of generality because it is optimal to train permanent workers upon
hiring them) while the ring cost is paid when rms re permanent workers. In
addition, rms have to pay a per period xed cost of production, cf > 0, that
generates endogenous exit in the model.
Value of an incumbent rm
The state variables of a rm is given by the specic growth rate of productivity,
g, and rms age, a. The aggregate state variable is the labor market tightness,
. Firms choose a production plan that maximizes discounted lifetime prots. A
production plan for a rm with growth rate g and age a is described by the mass
of temporary workers, nT (g; a), and for the mass of hired and red permanent
workers , h(g; a) and f(g; a), respectively, and a time of exit , J(g). As described
below, wages are determined through bargaining. In general, the wage that results
from bargaining depends on rm characteristics (g and a). For the moment, let us
postulate that the bargaining outcome can be summarized by the wage functions
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wT (g; a) and wP (g; a): Therefore, the value function of an incumbent rm is
V (g; a; ) = Max
J(g;a);fnT (g;a);f(g;a);h(g;a)gJ(g;a)J^a
Z J
a

ega(nT (g; a) + nP (g; a))
  wT (g; a)nT (g; a)  wP (g; a)nP (g; a)
  c
m()
 
nT (g; a) + h(g; a)
  h(g; a) t   f(g; a) f da
  nP (g; J(g; a)) f   cf (J(g; a)  a)
_nP = h(g; a)  f(g; a)
J(g; a)  J^
h(g; a); f(g; a); nT (g; a); nP (g; a)  0
nP (g; a) given:
Thus, a rm with state (g; a) decides how many vacancies to post so as to hire
the desired amount of workers
 
nT (g; a) + h(g; a)

, incurring a proportional cost of
posting vacancies cv = c=m() per unit of vacancy posted. It has to pay wages, as
well as ring costs and the per period xed production cost. When the rm dies, at
age J(g; a), it has to pay the ring costs to all permanent workers being red. The
rst constraint is the law of motion for permanent workers, and the other are just
feasibility constraints.
As explained before, when deciding on nT (g; a); f(g; a); and h(g; a) rms try to
balance the higher frequency of search cost expenditures associated to temporary
workers with higher ring costs associated to permanent workers, and this trade-o¤
determines the optimal composition of rmslabor force over their life cycle. Firms
may nd it optimal to hire permanent workers and pay the ring cost  f for two
reasons. First, to economize on matching costs. Second, permanent workers may be
more productive than temporary workers (  1,) where the case    1 represents
the human capital increase due to on the job training paid by the rm.
Entry decision
There is free entry of rms who are ex-ante identical in terms of productivity
growth rate and start with the same initial unitary productivity level. In order to
enter the industry rms must pay a sunk entry cost, Ce  0. After paying Ce they
get a draw of productivity growth rate g from the distribution G(g). After observing
g they pay the xed production cost, cf , post vacancies, pay training costs to the
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new permanent workers, and bargain over wages with matched workers. Therefore,
the value of the expected future discounted prots of a new rm is
Ve() =
Z
g
V (g; )dG(g): (2.1)
Since the function V (g) is increasing in g, the optimal exit decision involves a
threshold value ge such that a rm survive if g  ge.
Workers
Here we present the value function for employes and unemployed workers. The
appendix 4.1 contains details on the derivations of these equations. The value func-
tion of a worker employed in a rm in state (g; a) with a labor contract s = fT; Pg,
where s indicates temporary or permanent contract, is given by
W (g; a; s) = ws(g; a) + (g; a; s) [U  W (g; a; s)] + [1  (g; a; s)] _W (g; a; s);
where (g; a; s) denotes the probability that the rm decides to terminate the labor
contract. As explained before temporary contracts are terminated with probability
1. The value function of an unemployed worker is
U = b+ m()
Z
[W (g; a; s)  U ] d(g; a; s); (2.2)
where (g; a; s) denotes the conditional probability of being matched with a rm in
state (g; a) o¤ering a labor contract of type s. Of course, this probability is an equi-
librium object that will be formally dened later on and represents the distribution
of job o¤ers.
Equilibrium wages
The total surplus generated by a match between workers and rms is split between
them. The workers surplus is equal to the di¤erence between the value of being
employed W (g; a; s) by a rm with age a, rate of productivity growth g, under
contract s, and the value of being unemployed U . Firms surplus is simply equal to
the marginal increase in the rms value @V (g; a)=@nP (notice that it depends on the
labor contract, s = fT; Pg) since each employee is treated as the marginal worker.
Following Felbermayr et al (2011) we assume that the outcome of bargaining over the
division of the total surplus from the match satises the following surplus-splitting
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rule for the case of temporary workers
(1  )[W (g; a; T )  U ] = @V (g; a; )=@nT (g; a) = cv;
and for the case of permanent workers
(1  )[W (g; a; P )  U ] = @[V (g; a; )  (0   fn
P (g; a))]
@nP (g; a)
= ((g; a) +  f );
where  2 [0; 1] denotes the bargaining power of the worker, and (g; a) is a
co-state variable representing the shadow value of a permanent worker (which will
be dened formally later on). Applying the envelope theorem for each type of
labor contract we get the solutions. Given that we set up the problem of the rm
in continuous time, temporary workers obtain the value of being unemployed (the
unemployment benet) for every value of the bargaining power parameter, this is
wT (g; a) = b 8, as there is no stock value of a temporary worker to the rm. In the
case of permanent worker labor contract, as the threat point of the rm is  fnP , the
wage wP will be higher that the unemployment benet except in the case in which
the bargaining power of the rm is one ( = 0).
Lets solve for the permanent workers wage. We know from the value function
of a permanent worker that
W (g; a; P ) =
wP (g; a) + (g; a; P )U + (1  (g; a; P )) _W (g; a; P )
+ (g; a; P )
;
by plugging this equation in the bargaining problem we get
(1  )[w
P (g; a) + (g; a; P )U + (1  (g; a; P )) _W (g; a; P )
+ (g; a; P )
  U ] = ((g; a) +  f )
wP (g; a)  U + (1  (g; a; P )) _W (g; a; P )
+ (g; a; P )
=

1   ((g; a) +  f );
thus we have
wP (g; a) =

1   ((g; a) +  f )(+ (g; a; P ))  (1  (g; a; P ))
_W (g; a; P ) + U:
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From the value function of an unemployed worker we have
U = b+ m()
2664Z (W (g; a; T )  U)| {z }
=0
d(g; a; T ) +
Z
(W (g; a; P )  U)| {z }
= 
1  ((g;a)+f )
d(g; a; P )
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where the term inside the rst integral is equal to zero since we have shown that
(1 )[W (g; a; T ) U ] = 0 in the bargaining problem of temporary workers, and the
term inside the second integral is 
1  ((g; a) +  f ) since (1  )[W (g; a; P )  U ] =
((g; a) +  f ) in the bargaining problem of permanent workers. Therefore we have
that
U = b+ m()

1  
Z
[(g; a) +  f ]d(g; a; P ):
By plugging this equation in the wage equation we have found previously we get the
following expression for the wage of permanent workers
wP (g; a; P ) =

1  

((g; a) +  f )(+ (g; a; P )) + m()
Z
[(g; a) +  f ]d(g; a; P )

 (1  ) _W (g; a; P ) + b;
where remember that (g; a; P ) and _W (g; a; P ) are equilibrium objects. Given that
these variables are not easy to compute since now on we will follow the analysis
for the case in which the rm has all the bargaining power,  = 0, therefore,
wT = wP = b:
2.2.3 Stationary Equilibrium
Before dening a stationary equilibrium, it is convenient to introduce some
additional notation and dene the law of motion describing equilibrium aggregates.
In steady state there will be a constant inux of new rms. To characterize the
equilibrium distribution of rms we denote by M the mass of new entrants and we
dene the following indicator function
I(g; a) =
(
1 if a = J(g)
0 otherwise.
; (2.3)
and the mass of rms of age a and productivity growth g, X(g; a), which satises
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@X(g; a)
@a
=  I(g; a)X(g; a)
X(g; 0) = M
dG(g)
1 G(ge) if g  g
e
The above law of motion states that the mass of age 0 rms with productivity
growth g is given by the mass of entrants times the fraction of businesses that draw
productivity growth g among those businesses drawing g  ge. As rms aged, the
mass of businesses with productivity g stays constant until the optimal exit time
J(g). At this age, the mass of businesses with productivity g decreases by 100%.
The probability measure of rms with productivity growth rate eg and age ea,
hiring workers with contract type s 2 T; P , are dened as
(eg;ea; P ) = X(eg;ea)h(eg;ea)R
gge
R J(g)
0
X(g; a)h(g; a)dgda
;
(eg;ea; T ) = X(eg;ea)nT (eg;ea)R
gge
R J(g)
0
X(a; g)nT (a; g)dadg
:
In addition, the probability that a permanent worker in a business with state (g; a)
is red satises
(a; g; P ) =
(
1 if a = J(g)
f(g;a)
nP (g;a)
if a < J(g):
(2.4)
A stationary equilibrium is a list of rm decisions rules on temporary and perma-
nent employment nT (g; a); hiring h(g; a) and ring f(g; a), age of exit J(g), entry
threshold ge, value functions for rms, permanent and temporary employed workers
and unemployed workers (V ((g; a; )); W (g; a; P ); W (g; a; T ); U), wage functions
wT (g; a) and wP (g; a), probability measure for new hires (g; a; s), a mass of en-
trants M , unemployed NU and employed NE, and labor market tightness  such
that:
i) Prices wT (g; a) = wT (g; a) = b are given by Nash bargaining (under the as-
sumption  = 0).
ii) Given wT (g; a) and wT (g; a), the rmsproduction plans J(g); nT (g; a); f(g; a);
h(g; a)) are optimal.
iii) Free entry condition is satised Ce = Ve() =
R
g
max f0; V (g; )dG(g)g :
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iv) Laws of motions of di¤erent cohorts and entrants as described above,
@X(g; a)
@a
=  I(g; a)X(g; a);
X(g; 0) = M
dG(g)
1 G(ge) if g  g
e:
v) The mass of unemployed individuals nding jobs should be equal to the mass
of vacancies lled by rms
NUm() =
Z
gge
Z J(g)
0
X(g; a)

h(g; a) + nT (g; a)

dgda: (2.5)
vi) The mass of employed individuals satises
NE = 1 NU =
Z
gge
Z J(g)
0
X(g; a)

nT (g; a) + nP (g; a)

dgda: (2.6)
vii) The mass of workers nding jobs should be equal to the mass of workers being
red (so that unemployment is constant) due to exits and downsizing:
NUm() =
Z
gge
Z J(g)
0
X(g; a)

f(g; a) + nT (g; a)

dgda (2.7)
+
Z
gge
np(g; J(g))X(g; J(g))dg:
viii) The mass of entrant rms, M , is consistent with the equilibrium labor market
tightness, , according to 1 = NE(M; ) +NU(M; ):
Proposition 1 Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness: There exist a unique
pair (;M) that satises the equilibrium denition
Proof Since the newborn rm value, V (g; a; ); is monotone decreasing and
continuous in , thus the expected present discounted value at entry, Ve(), is also
monotone decreasing and continuous in . Given a value for Ce such that Ve( =
0) > Ce > Ve( = 1), by the intermediate value theorem there exist a unique
value  such that Ve(
)   Ce = 0. By linear homogeneity of bX(), bNE() anddV ac() in M (since policy functions h; f; nT are invariant in M) then employment
and vacancies are continuous and increasing in M and unemployment is decreasing
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in M; there exist a unique value M such that  = M
dV ac(g;a;)
1 M bNE(g;a;) 11:
2.2.4 Solving and characterizing the model for  = 0
As it was shown previously, the wage for temporary workers does not depend
on the bargaining power of the rm and is always equal to the unemployment ben-
et. On the other hand, the wage for permanent workers depends not only on the
bargaining power of the rm but also on equilibrium objects such as the fraction
of rms searching for permanent workers, and the optimal ring probability a rm
decides on their permanent workers. As it can be noticed in the following solu-
tions, dealing with such complicated expressions would make the analysis less clear
and increases signicantly the di¢ culty to focus in the main mechanisms and the
economic intuition of the model. Therefore, in this section, and for the rest of the
paper, we solve and characterize the solutions of the model for the case in which
rms have all the bargaining power. We leave the discussion of the general case for
the last sections.
The value of a new born rm with productivity growth rate g is given by
V (g; )  Max
J(g);fnT (g;a);f(g;a);h(g;a)gJ(g;a)J^a=0
Z J
0

ega(nT () + nP ())   (wTnT () + wPnP ())
  c
m()
[nT () + h()]  h() t   f() f

da
  nP (; J) f   cfJ
_nP = h(g; a)  f(g; a)
J(g; a)  J^
h(g; a); f(g; a); nT (g; a); nP (g; a)  0
nP (g; 0) = 0:
Under the assumption that rms have all the bargaining power both wages, for
temporary and permanent workers, are equal to the unemployment benet, wT =
wP = b. Therefore, the Hamiltonian associated to the above optimal control problem
11For more details see the solution algorithm in the appendix.
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is
H(g; nP (); nT (); h(); f(); ())  ega(nT () + nP ())   b  nT () + nP ()
 cv
 
nT () + h()  h() t   f() f
  fnP (; J; )  cfJ + (g; J; np) [h()  f()]
The Pontryagans Maximum Principle implies that the necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for an optimal solution to the above problem are given by the control
equations (to save space, we do not put the states of the control variables, except
for ):
@H
@nT
= egt(nT + nP ) 1   b  cv  0 with = if nT > 0; (2.8)
@H
@h
=  cv    t + (g; a)  0 with = if h > 0; (2.9)
@H
@f
=   f   (g; a)  0 with = if f > 0; (2.10)
the multiplier equation
@H
@nP
= egt(nT + nP ) 1   b =   _(g; a) (2.11)
and the state equation
@H
@
= _nP ) _n = h  f; (2.12)
and the transversality conditions
0  egJ(nT (g; J) + nP (g; J))   b nP (g; J) + nT (g; J) (2.13)
 cv

nT (g; J) + h(g; J)
   th(g; J)   ff(g; J)  cf
with = if J < J^;
(g; J) =   f (2.14)
The optimality conditions can easily be interpreted. Equation (2.8) states that
when rms hire temporary workers, they equate the marginal product of temporary
workers to the cost of hiring temporary workers (the wage rate plus the vacancy
cost). Firms that do not hire temporary workers exhibit a marginal product of
temporary workers below their hiring cost, thereby equation (2.8) holding with in-
equality. The co-state variable  represents the shadow value of a permanent worker.
Firms hiring permanent workers, equate the marginal value of permanent workers
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to the sum of recruiting and training costs (see (2.9)). The shadow value of a per-
manent worker decreases over time ( _ < 0). Intuitively, the value of a permanent
worker decreases as the horizon of the contractual relationship diminishes. The
transversality condition (2.14) states that at the end of the match, the value of a
permanent worker is equal to   f . The ring decision (2.10) ensures that the value
of a permanent worker cannot decrease below   f . Equation (2.11) and _ < 0
imply that the marginal product of permanent workers is above the wage (b) paid
to permanent workers. Firms exit at the maximum possible age (J^) when prots
are positive at the end of the life cycle. Otherwise, rms exit when prots become
equal to zero (see equation (13)). As we shall see, rms exit at J < J^ only if g < 0.
Characterizing rmsdecisions.
In this section we show how the model works by providing a characterization
of the optimal composition of the labor force for each rms type as well as the
optimal age at exit. Besides, we show that there is a particular productivity growth
rate g < 0 below which rms only use temporary labor contracts over their life
cycle and above which rms also employ permanent workers and exit at age bJ . In
addition we analyze the behavior of rms with zero productivity growth rate (that
just hire permanent workers). Once we show how the model works, in the following
sections we analyze the general equilibrium e¤ects that changes in the labor market
regulations have on the size distribution of rms and aggregate productivity.
We have assumed that the production function is of the form
f(nT + P ) = (nT + nP ): (2.15)
Lets make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1. (1  )


b+ cv
 
1 
> cf
Assumption 2. J^ >
cv +  t +  f
(b+ cv)   b
Assumption 1 ensures that rms are protable at age 0 so that the model econ-
omy features a non-trivial equilibrium with production. In characterizing the be-
havior of rms, we nd it convenient to partition rms in two groups depending on
whether they ever hire permanent workers or not. The rst group is comprised by
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rms whose rate of growth g is higher than the threshold value g:
g  (1  )(b+ cv)   b
cv +  t +  f
ln
"
cf
1  

b+ cv

 
1 
#
< 0 (2.16)
where g < 0 follows from Assumption 1. On the other hand, rms with low
productivity growth (g < g) do not hire permanent workers.
Using the fact that permanent workers are only hired if their marginal product is
above the wage rate (b), (2.11) implies that the shadow value of permanent workers
decreases with the age of the rm,
egt(nT + nP ) 1   b =   _  0) _  0: (2.17)
The declining value of permanent workers implies that if a rm does not hire
permanent workers at age 0, it will not do it at a later age (n(g; 0)P = 0) n(g; a)P =
0 for all a). Whether a rm nds it protable to hire a permanent worker at age
0, depends on its expected lifetime at birth. Intuitively, if the expected lifetime
is long enough, the rm can recoup the xed cost of hiring a permanent worker.
The expected life of a rm at birth is (weakly) increasing in its rate of productivity
growth (g). Assumption 2 implies that rms with positive productivity growth have
incentives to hire permanent workers at age 0 (nP (g; 0)) > 0):
Case I: Firms with low productivity growth (g < g). As it was explained in
previous sections, the value of a permanent worker decreases as the horizon of the
contractual relationship diminishes. In particular, there are rms with such a low
productivity growth rate that nd it optimal to exit relatively soon, thus they do not
hire permanent workers at all. This is the case we analyze here. We start by solving
the optimization problem under the assumption that nP (g; 0) = 0. We then nd
restrictions in the parameter space so that the optimal solution has this property.
The optimal amount of temporary workers follows from (2.8):
nT (g; a) =

ega
b+ cv
 1
1 
: (2.18)
Operating prots at age a satisfy:
(g; a) = egtf(nT (g; a))  (b+ cv)nT (g; a)  cf ; (2.19)
= (1  )e ga1 


b+ cv
 
1 
  cf : (2.20)
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Using (2.20) it follows that rms make positive prots at age 0 ((g; 0) > 0) if
Assumption 1 holds.
The rm shuts down if (J) = 0 for some J < J^: Solving for J we obtain the
age of exit as a function of productivity growth (g):
J(g)  (1  )
g
ln
"
cf
1  

b+ cv

 
1 
#
: (2.21)
The value of a permanent worker at age J is equal to   f (see equation (2.14)).
Using equations (2.8) and (2.11), we can obtain an expression for (g; a):
(g; a) = (g; J) 
Z J
a
_dj (2.22)
=   f + [(b+ cv)   b] (J   a) (2.23)
Note that when (g; 0) < cv +  t ( 2.9) implies that h(g; 0) = 0 so that the initial
assumption of nP (g; 0) = 0 holds true. Using (2.23) it follows that (g; 0) < cv +  t
holds if
J <
cv +  t +  f
(b+ cv)   b (2.24)
Note that the condition in equation (2.24) is fairly easy to interpret when  = 1.
In this case, rms do not hire permanent workers at age 0 when the the optimal exit
age is such that J < cv+ t+f
cv
, which implies that the cost of hiring one temporary
worker for J periods (cvJ) is lower than the cost of hiring one permanent worker
(cv +  t +  f). Obviously, this condition will be violated when the optimal exit age
J is large enough.
Similar interpretation follows when  > 1. Firms do not hire permanent work-
ers at age 0 when the cost of hiring one temporary worker for J periods (J(b +
cv)) is lower than the cost of hiring one e¤ective permanent worker for J periods
(cv+ t+f+Jb

). Figure 6 presents the evolution of the shadow value of a permanent
worker as well as the dynamics of employment for temporary workers. Since the
optimal path value for hiring, ring and employment for permanent workers is zero,
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we do not plot them.
Figure 6: Dynamics of (g; a) and nT (g; a) for g < g.
Combining (2:21) and (2.24) we nd that rms do not hire permanent workers
when the rate of productivity growth (g) is such that:
(1  )
g
ln
"
cf
1  

b+ cv

 
1 
#
<
cv +  t +  f
(b+ cv)   b (2.25)
Rewriting the last expression and using the fact that g < 0 we obtain12
g < g  (1  )(b+ cv)   b
cv +  t +  f
ln
"
cf
1  

b+ cv

 
1 
#
(2.26)
Hence, we have shown that rms with g < g do not hire permanent workers.
Moreover, Assumption 2 and equation (2.21 imply that rms with productivity g
exit before the terminal period since J(g) < J^ and the optimal age at exit J(g)
increases with the rate of productivity growth.
Case II: Firms with high productivity growth (g > g). In this case we consider
rms whose productivity growth is su¢ ciently high enough, even though it could be
negative, to make them protable to hire permanent workers at age 0 (nP (g; 0) > 0).
These are rms that last longer in the marker than the ones in Case I. These rms
can further be partitioned in two groups: Those who only hire permanent workers
at age 0 and those who hire permanent workers for a period of time after birth of
the rm. The second group of rms are those with g > 0.
12Assumptions A2 implies that rms with g > 0 will nd it optimal to hire permanent workers at age 0.
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J -tf+[(b+Cvly-b](J-al 
1 Age J 1 Age 
Case II-A: g > 0: Assumption 1 ensures that (g; 0) > 0 and g > 0 implies that
(g; a) > 0 for all a. As a result, the optimal exit time satises J = J^ . Note that
equation (2.9) implies that rms hire permanent workers at age a if (g; a) = cv+ t.
Now, since (g; a) is a continuous function and (g; J) =   f we know that there
exist some a1 < J such that rms do not hire permanent workers for all a  a1.
Intuitively, it is not optimal to incur the xed costs of hiring and training permanent
workers when the age of rms is su¢ ciently close to the age at which they exit the
industry. In gure 7 it can be noticed that rms hire permanent workers until age
a1, and since then on the employment of permanent workers remains constant until
the rm exit the industry. At that point in time the ring policy for permanent
workers becomes positive.
Figure 7: Dynamics of main variables for g > 0.
Now, notice that (2.9) implies
h(g; a) > 0) (g; a) = cv +  t ) _ = 0: (2.27)
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Substituting _ = 0 in (2.11), we obtain that the marginal product of permanent
workers at age a is equal to b. Then, the rst order condition on temporary workers
(2.8) holds with strict inequality so that nT (g; a) = 0 for all a  a1. Setting _ = 0
and nT (g; a) = 0 in (2.11), we obtain
nP (g; a) =
( 

b
ega
 1
1  for a 2 [0; a1];
nP =


b
ega

1
 1
1  for a 2 [a1; J ]:
(2.28)
For a 2 [a1; J ] we have h(g; a) = 0 so that (2.9) holds with inequality. After age
a > a1, the marginal product of labor rises at a rate g until it reaches the value of
cv + b. Lets denote by a2 the age at which the marginal product of labor becomes
equal to b + cv. At this age, it becomes protable to hire temporary workers and
the FOC with respect to temporary workers hold with equality. The threshold age
a2 is obtained from
a2 
1
g
ln

cv + b

(np)1 

: (2.29)
Dening the threshold growth rate of productivity
g2 
1
J^
ln

cv + b

(np)1 

; (2.30)
it follows that rms with productivity growth g < g2 do not hire temporary workers
(nT (g; a) = 0 for all a) since a2 > J^ so that they do not reach age a

2: Firms with
g > g2 live beyond age a

2 and hire temporary workers during the period a 2 [a2; J^ ].
In Figure 8, the last two panels on the right, the optimal path for the hirings of
temporary workers, nT (a), and the marginal product of labor are indicated by the
dashed lines (case in which g < g2), while the solid lines indicate the case for
rms with g > g2. For the case of rms with g > g

2, the optimal amount of
temporary workers nT (g; a) is obtained by solving (2.8) with equality and setting
nP (g; a) = nP.
We close the characterization of the rm problem for rms with g > 0, by showing
how to obtain the threshold age a1 (the values of a

2 and n
P are expressed in terms
of a1). To this end, we use
  f = (g; J) = (g; 0) +
Z 0
J
_da (2.31)
If the rm does not hire temporary workers during its life cycle (g < g2 so that
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a2 > J^), a

1 is obtained by solving the following equation
  f = cv +  t +
Z a1
0
0dt+
Z J
a1
(b  egt  nP 1)dt (2.32)
= cv +  t + b(J   a1)  
 
nP
 1 1
g
 
egJ   ega1 ; (2.33)
where we have used (2.11), (2.31), and the fact that (g; a) is constant while
h(g; a) > 0.
If the rm hires temporary workers at the end of its life cycle (g > g2 so that
a2 < J^), a

1 is obtained by solving the following equation
  f = cv +  t +
Z a1
0
0dt+
Z a2
a1
(b  egt  nP 1)dt (2.34)
+
Z J^
a2
(b  egt  nP + nT (g; t) 1)dt (2.35)
= cv +  t + b(a

2   a1)  
 
nP
 1 1
g
 
ega

2   ega1 (2.36)
+b(J^   a2)  [(b+ cv)  b] (J^   a2): (2.37)
where we have used (2.8), (2.11), (2.31), and the fact that (g; a) is constant while
h(g; a) > 0.
Case II-B: g = 0: Firms with g = 0 hire permanent workers at age 0 and then
do not hire any additional worker (neither temporary nor permanent). Assumption
1 implies that these rms exit at the terminal period (J = J^). Equation (2.9) implies
that (g; 0) = cv +  t. For nP (g; a) = nP (g; 0) for all a, equation (2.11) requires
that _ =  for some constant  < 0. We then have
(g; a) = (g; 0) +
Z a
0
_(g; t)dt = (0) +
Z a
0
dt (2.38)
= cv +  t + a (2.39)
Using the transversality condition (g; J^) =   f , we obtain  =   cv+ t+fJ : Equa-
tion (2.11) at time 0 implies that the marginal product of labor with respect to
permanent workers is such that
nP (g; 0) 1 = b+
cv +  t +  f
J^
: (2.40)
83
Since rms do not hire temporary workers, the FOC with respect to temporary
workers at time 0 (equation 2.8) implies that
nP (g; 0) 1 < b+ cv: (2.41)
Combining (2.40) and (2.41), it is optimal for rms with g = 0 to hire perma-
nent workers at time 0 but not temporary workers when the following parameter
restriction applies
1


b+
cv +  t +  f
J^

< b+ cv;
which holds true under Assumption 2.
Using (2:40) to solve for nP (g; 0) we obtain
nP (g; 0) =
 
J
bJ^ + cv +  t +  f
! 1
1 
: (2.42)
Figure 8 presents the optimal path for the shadow value of hiring permanent workers,
the hirings and total employment of permanent workers, and its marginal produc-
tivity.
Figure 8: Dynamics of main variables for g = 0.
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Case II-C: g < g < 0: Firms with productivity growth rate g < g < 0
hire permanent workers in period 0 and exit at age J < J^ . From equation (2.9)
we have that the shadow value of permanent workers is such that 0 = cv +  t.
Permanent employment remains constant up to a period time in which the growth
rate declines enough so as to induce the rm to begin ring permanent workers.
Formally, nP (g; a) = nP (g; 0) for t 2 [0; af ], for some af > 0: The shadow value of
permanent workers decrease and may reach the value of   f at age af < J (see
Figure 9). To put it di¤erently, rms start ring workers before the age of exit and
there is a period at the end of the life cycle in which the FOC (2:10) holds with
equality (f(g; a) > 0 for a 2 [af ; J ]). Formally, dene af  mina(a) =   f : Note
that af is the rst age at which (g; a) =   f :
Firms start ring workers before exiting. For a  af ,
f(g; a) > 0) (g; a) =   f ) _ = 0: (2.43)
Using (2.11) we have that permanent employment, before rings take place, is given
by
nP (g; a) =

ega
b
 1
1 
if a  af (2.44)
The optimal age to exit is obtained by solving for J the following equation
(g; J) = egJ

nP (g; J)
   bnP (g; J)  cf = 0; (2.45)
where nP (g; J) is obtained from (2.44). The value of af is obtained from
  f = (g; af ) = (g; 0) +
Z af
0
_dt (2.46)
= cv +  t +
Z af
0

b  egt nP (g; af ) 1 dt (2.47)
= cv +  t + baf   

nP (g; af )
 1 egaf   1
g
; (2.48)
where nP (g; af ) is obtained from (2.44). Figure 9 shows the dynamics of all relevant
variables. The shadow value of permanent workers is positive when the rm is born
and then declines over time, as the marginal product of labor decreases, while the
employment of permanent workers remains constant up to age af . At that point in
time the rm starts ring permanent workers and, the marginal product of labor
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remains constant and the rm reduces its size up to the optimal age to exit, J .
Figure 9: Dynamics of main variables for g < g < 0.
2.2.5 Analyzing the impact of labor market institutions
In this section we analyze and characterize the e¤ect that an increase in the
ring costs of permanent workers have on rms selection and the employment of
temporary and permanent workers of rms with di¤erent productivity levels a¤ect-
ing the equilibrium size distribution of rms and aggregate productivity. Formally,
following the solution algorithm steps explained in the appendix 4.2, an increase
in the ring cost of permanent workers,  f , generates a decline in the equilibrium
labor market tightness (see Figure 10). This is, as  f increases, the expected future
discounted prots of a new rm decreases (at the initial labor market tightness,
0). In Figure 10 this is reected by a downward shift in the curve representing the
expected value at entry. To match the entry cost, Ce; discounted prots need to
be higher. Since the expected value at entry, Ve(), is strictly decreasing in , this
86
implies that the equilibrium labor market tightness decreases.13 We denote the new
value for the labor market tightness as 1.
Figure 10: E¤ect on the equilibrium .
The intuition behind the previous result is the following. An increase in the
ring costs to permanent workers reduces prots (in particular, penalizing more to
rms with high productivity growth rate which concentrates a big fraction of em-
ployment), inducing to less vacancy posting. Therefore, the labor market tightness
declines up to a point in which the value at entry matches again the cost of entry
(Ve(

1) = Ce). As a result, in the new situation there are less vacancies relative to
the unemployed workers in the economy.
Furthermore, recall that rms with g < g do not hire permanent workers, where
g  (1  )(b+ cv)   b
cv +  t +  f
ln
"
cf
1  

b+ cv

 
1 
#
< 0: (2.49)
As mentioned before, note that Assumption 1 implies that g < 0 since ln
h
cf
1 
 
b+cv

 
1 
i
<
0: It then follows that an increase in  f has two e¤ects on g that go in the same
direction (which are analyzed in detail later on):
a) Partial equilibrium e¤ect: @g

@f
> 0: The threshold value of productivity growth
at which rms start hiring permanent workers increase. Hence, an increase in
ring costs reduces the mass of businesses hiring permanent workers.
b) General equilibrium e¤ect I: An increase in  f reduces prots, inducing to less
vacancy posting, and a rise in the unemployment to vacancy ratio. In turn,
this increases the probability that a rm matches with a worker (reduces cv
13See the solution method in the appendix for further details.
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for a xed vacancy cost c, this is cv = c=m() decreases). Thus, we have that
@cv
@f
< 0 and @g

@cv
< 0 so that the general equilibrium e¤ect of an increase in  f
is to increase g.
These two forces give incentives to high productivity rms to reduce their size.
Thus, both e¤ects act on the intensive margin. In addition to the previous e¤ects
there is another general equilibrium force that induces more distortions in the econ-
omy. This additional mechanism has an impact on the extensive margin:
c) General equilibrium e¤ect II: Exit. In general equilibrium, an increase in  f
subsidizes rms with low growth by reducing the costs of lling up temporary
jobs. This subsidy distorts the exit decision of rms by encouraging the hiring
of temporary workers. The age of shutdown of low growth rms increases
(exit margin). On the other hand, the age of shutdown of high growth rms
decreases (exit margin).14
In what follows, we show that as  f increases rms with low productivity growth
rates g < g expand, but still employ only temporary workers, and live longer. Firms
with intermediate productivity growth rates, g < g < 0, contract and exit earlier.
Firms with zero productivity growth contract, and nally the most productive rms,
with g > 0, contract. As a result, higher ring costs for permanent workers penalizes
relatively more to rms with high productivity growth and subsidizes rms with low
productivity growth, shifting employment from the rst ones, which contract and
last shorter in the market, to the second ones, which expand and last longer in
the market. A higher relative ring costs for permanent workers play similar role
as a size-dependent-policy by distorting rm selection as well as the allocation of
resources across rms implying changes in the size distribution of rms and resulting
in a lower aggregate productivity.
We now analyze formally the e¤ect of an increase in ring costs to permanent
workers in detail. We organize the analysis by focusing on the e¤ects on rms with
di¤erent productivity growth rates. The derivations of all these cases follow the
characterization of rmsoptimal decisions made in the previous sections.
Case I. We rst focus on rms with low productivity growth. When there is an
increase in  f it can be seen from equation (23) that the slope of (g; a) increases
while change in the intersection with the vertical axis is ambiguous. Figure 11
documents the dynamics of the main relevant variables for the case of rms with
14Our model economy assumes that all businesses start with the same productivity and Assumption 1
ensures that businesses are protable at age 0. Now, if we assume that businesses also di¤er in terms of
their initial productivity then some businesses might not be protable at age 0. In this case, the hiring
subsidy of temporary workers (induced by f ) will also distort the entry margin by encouraging entry of
businesses with low initial productivity. This extension is left for future research.
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g < g. From equation (21) we have that ine¢ cient rms lasts longer in the market,
@J
@ f
=
 @cv
@f
(b+ cv)g
> 0:
In addition, from equation (18) it can be noticed that rms with productivity growth
rates g < g employ more temporary workers than before (see Figure 11). As these
rms last longer in the market their total factor productivity declines further than
before the increase in  f .
Figure 11: Dynamics of main variables for g < g.
Case II-A. Figure 12 presents the comparative statics results for the case of
rms with positive productivity growth rates. Since these rms make positive prots
at the beginning of their life-cycle their duration in the market does not change
( @J
@f
= 0). An increase in  f generates a decline in the LHS of equation (33) and
(34), which determines the threshold a1. Therefore, the RHS has to decrease to
restore the equality, and since @n
P (g;a)
@a1
> 0, thus a1 decreases (in Figure 12). The
new age threshold is denoted by a01 , and the new ring cost is denoted by 
0
f .
Moreover, equations (28), (29), and (30) indicate that rms reduce the employment
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of permanent workers, nP (g; a) and nP (g; a1) (which is reected by a downward shift
in the nP (g; a) curve in Figure 12 ), and they stop recruiting permanent workers
sooner than before and start hiring temporary workers faster, as also a2 and g

2
decline (notice that @a

2
@a1
> 0). In addition, as the following expression indicates,
nT (g; a) =

ega
b+ cv
 1
1 
  nP (g; a1);
rms increase the employment of temporary workers. This is reected by an upward
shift in the nT (g; a) curve in Figure 12. As a result, the dynamic path for the
marginal productivity of labor is lower than before the increase in the ring cost to
permanent workers.
Figure 12: Dynamics of main variables for g > 0.
Case II-B. Firms with constant productivity stay active in the market up to
period bJ . Since they optimally employ permanent workers to save on search costs
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they are penalized by the increase in the ring costs  f . Thus, they reduce the
employment level of permanent workers. Formally, when  f increases, the lower
labor market tightness induces lower search costs. Thus, equation (39) shows that
the shadow value of permanent workers decreases for every point in time. From
expression (42) it is clear that the level of permanent employment decreases (see
Figure 13).
Figure 13: Dynamics of main variables for g = 0.
Case II-C. Firms with productivity growth g < g < 0 also employ permanent
workers and thus are also directly a¤ected by an increase in the ring costs to
permanent workers. They hire fewer workers than before and exit the industry
sooner than before the increase in  f . Formally, from equation (48), to match a
higher  f the optimal age at which the rm starts to re permanent workers (af)
increases. Notice that, nP (g; a) = nP (g; 0) for t 2 [0; af ]. Since the permanent
employment, before rings take place, is given by
nP (g; a) =

ega
b
 1
1 
if a  af ;
the number of permanent workers a rm hires is a negative function of the age af .
Therefore the number of permanent workers decreases. Since the shadow value of
permanent workers is such that 0 = cv +  t; and then decreases over time, we
have that the new path for (g; a) is below the previous one. As prots are lower
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than before for these rms, the optimal age to exit decreases. Figure 14 shows the
dynamics of all relevant variables for this case.
Figure 14: Dynamics of main variables for g < g < 0.
Altogether, as mentioned before, an increase in  f leads to a reduction of the
number of rms hiring permanent workers (extensive margin) and an increase in the
number of rms hiring temporary workers. Moreover, among rms hiring permanent
workers, an increase in  f reduces the number of permanent workers hired (intensive
margin). The general equilibrium e¤ect of an increase in ring costs  f implies that
rms with g < g hire more temporary workers due to the higher probability of lling
a vacancy. Thus, an increase in  f shifts employment from permanent contracts to
temporary contracts and from rms with high productivity growth rate to rms with
low productivity growth rate. Total factor productivity decreases because the share
of employment in highly productive rms decreases and rms spend less resources
in training workers.
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2.3 Conclusion and nal remarks
Motivated by the fact that countries with strict employment protection legisla-
tion of permanent contracts have relatively smaller rms (that concentrate a higher
fraction of total employment) and lower aggregate productivity, the current paper
develops a model of rm dynamics with search frictions and asymmetric ring costs
for temporary and permanent workers. We showed in a very stylized model that
ring costs of permanent workers act as size-dependent-policies. Stricter DEPL
distorts rm selection as well as the allocation of resources across rms.
As long as it takes longer to high productivity rms to exit (they have longer
expected life span) and there are search frictions, the main mechanisms, insights
and results of our paper will hold in a more realistic and richer Hopenhayn and
Rogersons (1992) style model. Moreover, there is empirical evidence suggesting
that smaller rms have a lower probability of survival and younger rms have a
higher probability of exiting.15 Table 4 shows the pattern of exit rate. Conditional
on size younger rms have lower survival rate, and conditional on age, bigger rms
have higher survival rate.
Table 4: Firm exit rates by age and size.
Source: US Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics 2010.
Therefore, the data suggests that the mechanism of our paper is empirically rel-
evant. In a more general model in which rms face mean reverting idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, it takes longer for large rms to exit the industry. If persis-
tence is very high, as documented in the data, rms with productivity shocks above
the mean expects that high shocks today will be around for a long time, thus they
are unlikely to exit the industry (they need to accumulate many negative shocks
to abandon the industry). In contrast, for small rms (with low productivity level)
15For further details see Sutton (1997), Caves (1998), Geroski (1998), Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson
(1988, 1989a,b).
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few small negative productivity shocks make them exit relatively soon. In addi-
tion, if search frictions are present, it is more valuable for large rms with higher
survival rate to hire permanent workers. Therefore, the insights of our paper trans-
late into a more realistic Hopenhayn and Rogersons (1992) style model with search
frictions. As an extension to this paper, we are working in such a model and we
plan to calibrate it the US economy and perform quantitative analysis to evaluate
how dual employment protection legislation (with coherent parameters for ring
costs of permanent workers) account for di¤erences aggregate productivity and size
distributions of rms between Spain and US. In the new model we also plan to
endogenize wages (Nash bargaining) and analyze the e¤ects of wage bargaining at
di¤erent levels (rm level and collective bargaining).
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2.4 Appendix
2.4.1 Derivation of value functions for employed and unemployed work-
ers
Consider discrete time with a period length 4. Denote by p the probability
of nding a job per unit of time so that in a period of length 4 the probability
of nding a job is 4p. The discount rate per unit of time is . The value of an
unemployed worker is
Ut = 4b+4pe 4
Z
W (g; t+4; s)d(g; t; s)
+ (1 4p) e 4Ut+4
Ut   e 4Ut+4 = 4b+4pe 4
Z
[W (g; t+4; s)  Ut+4] d(g; t; s)
Ut   [1  4]Ut+4 = 4b+4p[1  4]
Z
[W (g; t+4; s)  Ut+4] d(g; t; s);
where the last row makes a Taylor expansion of the term e 4 at 4 = 0: Diving
both sides of the equation by 4 and taking the limit as 4! 0 gives
_U + U = b+ p
Z
[W (g; t; s)  U ] d(g; t; s); (2.50)
and using stationarity of U we can set _U = 0 to obtain the value function of an
unemployed worker
U = b+ m()
Z
[W (g; t; s)  U ] d(g; t; s):
Similar algebra can be done to obtain the value function of a permanent worker,
W (g; a; P ) = 4awP (g; a; P ) + [1 4a(g; a; P )] e 4aW (g; t+4a; P )
+4a(g; a; P )e 4aU
Rearranging terms,
W (g; a; P )  e 4aW (g; a+4a; P ) = 4awP (g; a)
 4a(g; a; nP )e 4aW (g; a+4a; P ) + 4a(g; a; P )e 4aU
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W (g; a; nP )  [1  4]W (g; a+4a; P ) = 4awP (g; a)
 4a(g; a; P )e 4aW (g; a+4a; P ) + 4a(g; a; P )e 4aU
Diving both sides of the equation by 4a and taking the limit as 4a ! 0 gives
dW
da
+ W (g; a; P ) = wP (g; a; P ) + (g; a; P ) [U  W (g; a; P )] ; (2.51)
where dW
da
= @W
@a
+ @W
@nP
dnp
da
; and dn
p
da
= _np
2.4.2 Solution method
The algorithm to compute the equilibrium is as follows (see Figure 15):
1) Given an initial guess for labor market tightness, 0, obtain policy functions
nT (g; a); h(g; a); f(g; a), and optimal age of exit J(g) and entry threshold ge:
2) Compute newborn rms value functions V (g; ) and the expected value at
entry, Ve() =
R
g
max f0; V (g; )dG(g)g, and
 If Ve() < Ce )guess a lower  by bisection and repeat from point (1):
 If Ve() < Ce )guess a higher  by bisection and repeat from point (1):
When Ve(
)  Ce )stop and go to next point.
3) Set the mass of entrants to one, M = 1, and use decision rules to compute the
measure of rm of di¤erent age and growth rate, bX(g; a). Compute aggregate
employment of permanent workers and aggregate vacancy postings whenM =
1, denoted by (dV ac):
bNEP (g; a; ) = Z
gge
Z J(g)
0
bX(g; a)nP (g; a)dadg
dV ac(g; a; ) = 1
m()
Z
gge
Z J(g)
0
bX(g; a) nT (g; a) + h(g; a) dadg:
Notice that the supra hat in all variables indicates when M = 1.
4) Use the linear homogeneity of bX(), bNEP () and dV ac() in M to compute the
equilibrium measure of entrants, M, consistent with the equilibrium labor
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market tightness, ; see Figure 15,
Figure 15: Equilibrium  and M.
this is, nd M such that  = M
dV ac(g;a;)
1 M bNEP (g;a;) where 1  M bNEP (g; a; ) =
NU :
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Chapter 3
Size-Dependent Policies and Vertical Integration
3.1 Introduction
In this paper I develop a model in which regulations that restrict the size of estab-
lishments (size-dependent policies) distort rmsoptimal organization of production
and have non trivial-e¤ects on the size distribution of rms and total factor produc-
tivity (TFP).1 The model is motivated by three facts: 1) cross country disparities in
income per-capita are mostly accounted for by di¤erences in TFP, 2) there are sys-
tematic di¤erences in the organization of production across countries, in particular,
developing countries have fewer vertically integrated rms, 3) vertically integrated
rms are more productive, bigger and are matched to better suppliers (with high
productivity and size).
I develop a dynamic model of an industry with heterogeneous rms interacting as
buyers and sellers of inputs, endogenous vertical integration, and market frictions.
In the model economy, the vertical industrial structure emerges endogenously as the
result of optimal investment decisions that rms undertake. Firms choose whether to
integrate to external sellers and use specialized inputs in their production process, or
buy homogeneous (standardized) inputs in the market. The use of specialized inputs
requires an investment (the acquisition of suppliers plant) and it implies variable
cost advantages that depend on both, the productivity of manufacturer and supplier.
In addition, vertical integration imposes a higher per period xed cost of production,
which reects the additional managerial costs of managing two plants. Thus, only
high productivity manufacturers (downstream rms) become vertically integrated
1Guner, Ventura and Xu (2008) provide real world examples of size-dependent policies including policies
that limit the size of manufacturing establishments in India, the size of retail establishments in Japan,
and employment protection policies in Italy that only take e¤ect beyond a certain size threshold. In the
current paper, size-dependent policies are modelled as taxes on output or labor costs that establishments
above a certain size have to pay. For quantitative analysis of small scale reservation laws in India, which is
an extreme form of size-dependent policies, see Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2012). Garicano, Lelarge,
and Reenen (2012) study labor regulations that only bind for rms with more than 50 workers in France.
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with high productivity suppliers. In this framework, distortions on production and
employment generate a reallocation of resources (employment) from big rms to
small rms and act as barriers to vertical integration.
The current paper is related to two literature. First, a large literature has
emerged to understand the signicant di¤erences in output per capita across coun-
tries. Although di¤erences in resource endowments may play a role to explain this
fact (e.g. Caselli and Coleman 2006) these di¤erences have been attributed to di¤er-
ences in productivity, and not to factor endowments.2 ;3 Such di¤erences in produc-
tivity can emerge from distortions that perturb the e¢ cient allocation of resources
across production units. A growing body of recent literature has recently focused on
distortions that a¤ect the e¢ cient allocation of resources across production units and
show how such distortions can have substantial e¤ects on aggregate productivity.
At the broadest level, the literature has focused on trade restrictions, nancial fric-
tions, and other regulations associated to industrial policy as a source of resource
misallocation. For instance, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) model distortions as
rm or plant-specic. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) follow Restuccia and Rogerson and
study the impact of misallocation across establishments in explaining productivity
in manufacturing in China and India. Furthermore, they, as well as Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013), recover the underlying distortions from observed
allocations.4 Guner, Ventura and Xu (2008), using a Lucas (1978) span-of-control
model, consider policies that directly target the size of the establishment such as a
tax on factor inputs that establishments with more than given number of employees
must pay. When a general conguration of these policies are restricted to achieve
a given reduction in average establishment size, they nd a substantial reduction
in aggregate output per worker. In their set-up, size-dependent policies distort the
optimal allocation of resources across production units and move capital and labor
from more to less productive establishments. In this paper I focus on how distor-
tions that are rm specic and correlated with the size restrict the growth of e¢ cient
rms by a¤ecting the level of vertical integration activity. Size-dependent policies,
2Caselli and Coleman (2006) develop a model in which countries with large endowments of skilled labor
tend to have lower skill premiums and, consequently, are more likely to pick skill-intensive production
technologies.
3See King and Levine (1994), Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), and Caselli
(2005).
4Caselli and Gennaioli (2005), Erosa and Hidalgo (2008), and Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011), Gilchrist,
Sim and Zakrajsek (2013), Caggese and Cunat (2013), Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang (2013), Buera,
Moll and Shin (2013), focus on nancial frictions as a source of resource misallocation. While Bond,
Crucini, Rodrigue and Potter (2013), and Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2013), focus on trade
restrictions as a source of resource misallocation. And Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Guner, Ventura
and Xu (2008), Bhattacharya, Guner and Ventura (2013), Gabler and Poschke (2013), Brandt, Tombe and
Zhu (2013), Bollard, Klenow and Sharma (2013), Ziebarth (2013), and Obereld (2013), focus on other
regulations associated to industrial policy as a source of resource misallocation. Restuccia and Rogerson
(2013) provide a summary of the literature.
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by their very nature create a disincentive for rms to be large and limit vertical
integration.
Second, there is a big literature that focuses on the organization of production.
This literature, which goes back to the seminal paper by Coase (1937), has focused
on the scope of the market versus the rm. Since then, important contributions
on transaction cost economics and contract theory have been emphasizing the role
of transaction costs, asset specicity, supply uncertainty, incomplete contracting,
market power and regulation on vertical integration.5 According to Garnkel and
Hankins (2011), vertical integration is an important proportion of mergers and ac-
quisitions in US (uctuating from 44.7% to 33.4%). In addition, focusing on vertical
integration within industries in the US, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009, 2013) show
that vertically integrated producers are more productive, bigger and are matched
to better suppliers (with high productivity and size).6
Regarding the organization of production across countries, there is evidence in-
dicating a prevalence of subcontracting arrangements in the developing countries.7
Maquiavello (2012), discuss the theoretical and empirical literature on vertical in-
tegration across countries.8 Maquiavello (2006) documents a positive correlation
between vertical integration across 25 industries in the manufacturing sector and
the GDP per capita of each country. He uses the unweighted average of the ra-
tios of value added over output as a proxy of vertical integration. The use of the
unweighted average of the ratios of value added over output is a commonly used
proxy of vertical integration in the industrial organization literature.9. At the rm
level, the ratio of value added over output measures the proportion of the produc-
tion process that is carried out within rm boundaries. A higher value of the index
5The literature, at the broadest level, has considered the following perspectives on vertical integration:
agency theory articles include Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmstrom (1982); transaction costs theory
research includes Williamson (1979); and the references for the property right theory are Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). Gibbons (2005) provides a summary and a comparison of
these theories. The most recent surveys include Joskow (2005) and Lafontaine and Slade (2007). Recent
theoretical and empirical research on the study of the determinants and e¤ects of vertical integration within
and across industries include McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2002), Antras (2003), Acemoglu
et al. (2004) and (2005), Novak and Stern (2007a,b), Ciliberto and Panzar (2009), Legros and Newman
(2009) and Gibbons, Holden and Powell (2010).
6Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009) show that vertically integrated plants represents 8 to 9 percent of
the total plants and account for 25 to 30 percent of employment, in the manufacturing sector in US.
Furthermore, when vertically integrating, large and more productive downstream rms choose also large
and more productive upstream production units. In addition they nd that the fraction of vertically
integrated plants increases with size (smallest plants almost never integrate, 7 % of median-sized plants
are vertically integrated, and 67 % plants in the top percentile are vertically integrated). Besides, being
larger, vertically integrated plants have higher productivity (on average they are 40 % more productive).
7For instance, evidence from the computer industry in Taiwan (Levy 1990), the Guadalajara shoe
cluster in Mexico (Woodru¤ 2002), the Sinos Valley in Brazil (Schmitz 1995), the Tirupur cotton industry
in India (Banerjee and Munshi 2004). Andrabi et al. (2006) study the subcontracting arrangements of a
large tractor producer in Pakistan.
8See also Acemoglu et al. (2009).
9See Adelman (1955).
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is associated with a higher degree of vertical integration. Figure 1, taken from
Maquiavello (2006), shows that there is a higher propensity for rms to vertically
integrate in more developed countries, and is consistent with evidence suggesting
that subcontracting arrangements are fairly extensive in the developing countries.
The ratio of value added over output is 22% higher in developed countries relative
to developing coutries (44% versus 33%).
Figure 1: Vertical Integration and GDP Per Capita.
Source: Maquiavello (2006).
Motivated by these facts, I develop a dynamic model of an industry with het-
erogeneous rms interacting as buyers and sellers of inputs, endogenous vertical
integration, and market frictions. The model is calibrated to match selected char-
acteristics of the U.S. manufacturing sector, such us the size distribution of rms
and the share of vertically integrated rms. This framework is then used to study
the impact of size-dependent policies on the organization of production. I nd that
a 15% output tax on rms that are above mean level of productivity generates a
decline in the fraction of vertically integrated rms from 8.7% to 7%, a decrease
in TFP of 2.9%, and an increase of 11% in the mean size of rms. A 15% tax on
employment generates a decline in the fraction of vertically integrated rms from
8.6% to 7.1%, a decrease in TFP of 2.4% and a decline of 1.2% in the mean size of
rms.
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3.2 Model
In this section I develop a dynamic model of an industry with heterogeneous rms
interacting as buyers and sellers of inputs and market frictions, in which the ver-
tical industrial structure emerges endogenously as the result of optimal investment
decisions that rms undertake. Firms choose whether to integrate to external sell-
ers and use specialized inputs in their production process, or buy homogeneous
(standardized) inputs in the market. The model is based on Fossati (2013) that de-
velops a Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) style model to study how di¤erent vertical
relations (outsourcing vs. vertical integration) can emerge within an industry equi-
librium model. In the current paper, manufacturersidiosyncratic productivity is
assumed to be constant while in Fossati (2013) manufacturers face mean-reverting
idiosyncratic shocks. Furthermore, current model abstracts from outsourcing the
production of specialized inputs to external sellers. The rst simplication is not
a fundamental assumption, in the sense that the main result does not depend on
the nature of productivity shocks (whether they evolve over time or not), while
the second assumption may just moderate the impact of size-dependent-policies on
TFP.
3.2.1 Firms
Technology and static decisions
Manufacturers
Manufacturers produce homogeneous nal goods, using n units of labor and m
units of intermediate goods (inputs) according to the production function zy(n;m)
with decreasing returns to scale, where z is an idiosyncratic productivity shock.
This productivity shock is drawn from a density function g(z) upon entry and it is
constant (it does not change over the life-cycle of a rm).
There is exogenous exit. Every period rms may receive a negative productivity
shock that makes the rm die. This occurs with probability . Manufacturers sell
their products in a competitive market at price p, which is an equilibrium object (de-
termined by manufacturers free entry condition) and hire workers in a competitive
market at a wage rate w.
Manufacturers must pay a tax on production and employment (distortions are
going to be introduced one by one, not simultaneously), ( y; n), which are drawn
upon entry from g ( y; n j z) and depend on z. Lets assume  = ( y; n). Distor-
tions remain constant over time (more details on distortions will be explained later
on). Therefore, manufacturers are characterized by (z;  y; n):
When a manufacturer enters the industry, since it is not vertically integrated, it
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has to obtain its inputs from the market for standardized inputs. In particular, it
pays a price ps to buy standardized inputs. It is assumed that this price is determined
by Bertrand competition among suppliers. Once psm is paid to a randomly matched
supplier, the manufacturer simply produces zy(n;m) units of the nal good and pays
wages and taxes. Thus it has prot function as
(z; ) = max
n(z;);m(z;)
(1   y)pzy(n(z; );m(z; ))  n(z; )w(1 + n) m(z; )ps;
where n(z; ) and m(z; ) are the quantities of labor and standardized inputs
used in production; p; w and ps are the price of the nal good, the wage rate, and
the standardized input price, respectively.
After buying m units of input from a supplier, the manufacturer learns the
productivity " of the supplier, where " s gs("). One may interpret " as the quality of
the match (a match-specic productivity). Given the (z; ") pair, the manufacturer
has two options for the next period: rst, it can simply ignore " and continue
buying standardized inputs from the competitive market for inputs and, conditional
on staying in the market, getting matched to a new supplier. It is assumed that
productivity of standardized supplier is iid over time. Therefore, conditional on
staying in the market, this manufacturer will start the period in exactly the same
situation (as a not vertically integrated manufacturer), this is buying inputs at a
price ps and learning a new ".
Second, given (z; ") the manufacturer can become vertically integrated with the
particular supplier and produce in-house specialized inputs. Using specialized inputs
entails a variable cost advantage reected by the function c(z; "), where z and " are
complements. In order to become vertically integrated with the supplier it has to
pay the supplier a price P V I for its rm, which is the market value of the suppliers
plant. By becoming vertically integrated the manufacturer keeps matched with the
same suppliers type ". Thus, once a manufacturer becomes vertically integrated, the
state (z;  ; ") is xed (remains constant until exit). Vertically integrated producers
pay an additional xed cost of operation CV If (the xed cost of a manufacturer that
uses standardized inputs is zero). Thus the vertically integrated manufacturer has
prot function as
V I(z;  ; ") = max
nV I(z; ;");mV I(z; ;")
(1   y)pzy(nV I(z;  ; ");mV I(z;  ; ")) (3.1)
  (nV I(z;  ; ") +mV I(z;  ; "))(w   c(z; "))(1 + n)  CV If :
Suppliers
A supplier has constant returns to scale in labor, and sells m(z; ) units of
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standardized inputs according to its matched manufacturers derived demand at the
competitive price ps. Suppliers are ex-ante homogeneous but once it matches with a
manufacturer the quality " of the specialized input it is able to produce is realized.
In case it does not become vertically integrated with the manufacturer the quality
of the match, ", is iid over time. A standardized supplier has prot function as
s(z; ) = (ps   w)m(z; ); (3.2)
where (z; ) are its matched manufacturers states variables. In case the supplier
becomes vertically integrated with the manufacturer, it receives P V I(p; ps) and dis-
appears.
Timing
The timing for a not vertically integrated manufacturer attached to a given tax level
 is as follows. At the beginning of every period, according to its productivity z, it
decides how many workers to hire, and how many units of the standardized input to
buy. It pays a competitive standardized input price ps to an ex-ante homogeneous
randomly matched supplier for m units of inputs. Given its tax level, after observ-
ing " the standardized manufacturer may decide whether to remain not vertically
integrated or to become vertically integrated for the next period. At the end of the
period with probability  the rm exit the industry.
A manufacturer with attached tax level  = ( y; n) that is vertically integrated
with a supplier of type "; and given its productivity z, decides current production,
how many workers to hire and the quantity of inputs to produce. At the end of the
period with probability  the rm exit the industry.
Dynamic decisions
Incumbentsvalue functions
The state variables for an active not vertically integrated manufacturer rm is
its productivity z, the quality of its supplier ", and the tax  . Thus, assuming
stationary (distributions, then prices, do not change over time), a value function for
the not vertically integrated manufacturer rm is
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V (z;  ; ") = max
n(z;);m(z;);x0(z; ;")
(1   y)pzy(n(z; );m(z; ))  w(1 + n)n(z; )  psm(z; )
+
8>>>><>>>>:I(x
0()=NV I)(1  )
X
"0
V (z;  ; "0)gs("0)| {z }
Not vertically integrated
;
I(x0()=V I)

 P V I(p; ps) + (1  ) V
V I(z;  ; ")
1  (1  )

| {z }
Vertically integrated
9>>>=>>>; ;
(3.3)
where x0(z;  ; ") 2 fNV I; V Ig be the decision rules for the vertical state of a not
vertically integrated manufacturer that is matched with a particular supplier of type
".
The value function for a vertically integrated manufacturer is
V V I(z;  ; ") = max
nV I(z; ;");mV I(z; ;")
1
1 (1 ) [(1   1)pzy(nV I(z;  ; ");mV I(z;  ; "))
 (nV I(z;  ; ") +mV I(z;  ; "))(1 +  2)(w   c(z; "))  CV If ]:
(3.4)
With respect to suppliers, the value function of a not vertically integrated sup-
plier with productivity " that is matched with a manufacturer with productivity
and taxes (z; ) is
W (z;  ; ") = (ps   w)m(z; )
+
8>>>><>>>>:I(x
0(z; ;")=NV I)
X
z0
X
 0
X
"0
W (z0;  0; "0)Jd(z0;  0)gs("0)| {z }
manufacturer decides to continue not vertically integrated
+ I(x0(z; ;")=V I)P
V I(p; ps)| {z }
manufacturer decides to become VI
9=; :
(3.5)
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Entry
We assume that manufacturers cannot enter the industry being vertically integrated.
They must pay a sunk entry cost Cde  0; where d indicates downstream rm.
They draw z from g(z);  from g ( j z), and then match randomly with a supplier
according to gs("). Thus, the value of the expected future discounted prots of a
new downstream rm is
Ve(p; ps) =
X
z
X

X
"
V (z;  ; "; p; ps)g(z; )g
s("); (3.6)
where g(z; ) = g(z)g ( j z). Entrants in the input industry have to pay a sunk
entry cost Cse  0, where s indicates supplier or upstream rm, earn ps and draw "
according to gs(") and matches randomly with a not vertically integrated manufac-
turer according to J(z; ). Thus, the value at entry for an upstream rm is
We(p; ps) =
X
z
X

X
"
W (z;  ; "; p; ps)J(z; )g
s("): (3.7)
If a supplier becomes VI then it gets P V I(p; ps) and disappears.
Idiosyncratic Distortions
As in Bhattacharya, Guner, and Ventura (2011), the idiosyncratic distortions are
modeled as output and employment taxes on manufacturers (suppliers do not face
taxes since distortions would just a¤ect the equilibrium input price) that are depen-
dent on the initial ability level of the entrant, z. As the size of production that an
entrant can operate is (strictly) increasing in his productivity, z, relatively larger
rms will be more distorted than smaller ones. Upon entry, each rm with pro-
ductivity level above a given threshold bz pays a tax on production or employment
 =  y or n. Once an entrant is attached to a particular tax, this tax remains
constant over time. We assume that taxes are collected from managers and given
as a lump sum transfer to households as an income subsidy.
3.2.2 Households
The problem of the household is identical as the one in Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993). There is a continuum of identical agents with utility function
1X
t=1
t[u(ct)  (nt)];
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where ct is the consumption of a nal good, nt 2 f0; 1g is the labor supply, and
() is the disutility of work. This problem can be written as one in which there is
a representative agent with utility function
1X
t=1
t[u(ct)  aNt];
where Nt is the fraction of agents employed in period t. As it is well-known (see
Rogerson, 1988; and Hansen, 1985), this household problem with indivisible labor,
in stationary steady state with constant prices and 1=(1 + r) = , becomes static
and can be written in the following way
max
c;N
u(c)  aNt s:t: pc  wN +  +R;
where  is the aggregate prots, and R is the aggregate tax revenues (a lump sum
transfer from rms to the agents). The solution to this problem is N = Ls(p;+R)
that represents the aggregate labor supply:
3.2.3 Stationary Equilibrium
Because there is a continuum of rms that upon entry are subject to idiosyncratic
shocks and there is exogenous exit, there is a cross sectional distribution of rms
over the states (z;  ; ") and over di¤erent rmsvertical structures. We call  the
stationary distribution of manufacturers using standardized inputs, and V I and 
the stationary distribution of vertically integrated manufacturers and standardized
suppliers, respectively. Then, the steady-state stationary equilibrium is standard:
A stationary equilibrium in this model is a list of value functions for manufac-
turers and suppliers (V (z;  ; "); V V I(z;  ; "); andW (z;  ; "); policy functions n(z; ),
m(z; ); nV I(z;  ; "); mV I(z;  ; "), and x0(z;  ; "); prices p and ps; w and P V I(p; ps);
invariant measures for manufacturers using standardized inputs , vertically inte-
grated manufacturers V I and suppliers ; an invariant density of not vertically
integrated rms looking for a supplier J(z; ), a mass of downstream and upstream
entrants Md and M s, Ls(p; ps; w; +R), such that:
i) Given p; ps; w and P V I(p; ps), policy functions n(z; ), m(z; ); nV I(z;  ; ");
and mV I(z;  ; ") solve the static production decisions
ii) Given p; ps; w and P V I(p; ps), policy function x0(z;  ; ") solve the dynamic
decisions of not vertically integrated rms
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iii) Free entry conditions are satised for manufacturers
Ve(p; ps) =
X
z
X

X
"
V (z;  ; "; p; ps)g(z; )g
s("); (3.8)
and suppliers
We(p; ps) =
X
z
X

X
"
W (z;  ; "; p; ps)J(z; )g
s("): (3.9)
iv) Market clearing conditions are satised in the market for nal goods Dd(p) =
Sd(p) and in the market for standardized inputs Du(ps) = Su(ps)
vi) Market clearing condition is satised for the labor market Ld(p; ps; w;Md;M s) =
Ls(p; ps; w;(p; ps; w;M
d;M s) +R(p; ps; w;M
d;M s))
vii) Laws of motion of states are consistent with individual decisions (stationary
measures ,V I and  are xed points).
3.3 Quantitative Analysis
3.3.1 Calibration
In this section I specify functional forms for rms technology and assign parameter
values. Basically, the model is calibrated so that the industry stationary equilibrium
matches selected characteristics of the U.S. manufacturing sector taken from the
U.S. Census Bureau and Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009). In this calibration I treat
the US as an economy with no distortions. Table 1 summarizes the values for the
parameters set a priori.
Table 1: Parameters set a priori
Parameters Denition Value
 Discount factor 0:96 assumed
w Wage 1 normalized
 Extent of decreasing returns parameter 0:85 Restuccia Rogerson (2008)
 Exit rate 0:10 Bartelsman, et. al. (2003)
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The population mass is normalized to one, as well as the wage. I assume an
exogenous annual exit rate of 10%, consistent with Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and
Scarpetta (2013). In addition, I set a discount factor value  = 0:96. I assume a
Leontie¤production function, y(n;m) =minfn;mg, where the extent of decreasing
returns in the rm level production function is  = 0:85, that is the same value
used in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). Direct estimates of establishment level
production functions and di¤erent calibration procedures points to this value as
well.10 ;11
As xed production costs are zero and rms productivity do not evolve over
time, there will be no endogenous entry and exit. The distribution g(z) is chosen
so that the invariant distribution of rm size across employment levels matches the
data (see Figure 2).12 Since I have assumed that  is independent of z, the ratios
of establishment types in the total invariant distribution ( + V I) are similar as
in the distribution g(z), except for the fact that some rms that nd an e¢ cient
supplier become vertically integrated and thus expand. Therefore, by calibrating
the cost advantage function c(z; ") and the xed cost CV If I t the size distribution
of rms and the share of vertically integrated rms.13
I assume that the distribution for suppliers productivity gs(") is the same as
the distribution g(z). As in Fossati (2013), with respect to the function c(z; "), I
assume the following functional form
c(zi; "j) = T

zi   zmin
zmax   zmin
 
"j   "min
"max   "min
1 
;
which is increasing in zi and "j, with  2 [0; 1] and where the subindexes
min and max for z and " indicate the maximum and minimum values for z and
", respectively. The parameter T is the maximum gain from searching a supplier,
for the most e¢ cient manufacturer (being zn and matched with an "n, a supplier
reduces the nonsunk cost T ) after investing PV I in becoming vertically integrated.
10See Pavcnik (2002), Atkenson et al (1996), Veracierto (2001), and Atkenson and Kehoe (2005), among
others.
11Assuming a Leontie¤production function is not a fundamental assumption, since the main results of the
paper remain the same. For instance, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function allows manufacturers
to substitute n for m. However, notice that VI would still be discouraged, since a vertically integrated
manufacturer cannot avoid paying either taxes by substituting n by m. Looking at the prot function of
a vertically integrated manufacturer (Equation 2), after an increase in y it is clear that total production
would decline further under such a substitution. After an increase in n; besides declining production
further, still the rm pays n for total employment (n+m).
12 I approximate the distribution g(z) on a grid with 35 points considering a log-spaced grid so as to
have more points at lower levels of productivity than at higher levels of productivity.
13From the data, I only observe the number of rms for a set of employment ranges, therefore, I assume
that rms are uniformly distributed in each range so that the cumulative distribution function is a linear
interpolation across the points for which we have data.
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The parameter  indicates the relative importance of the manufacturers type, z, in
the decline of variable costs when investments in VI take place. Notice that c(z; ")
is exible, in the sense that it allows for the absence of increasing di¤erences. Table
2 presents the values for the calibrated parameters. Figure 2 shows the shape of the
function c(zi; "j) for the parameter values presented above.
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters.
Parameter Denition Value
T Gain from searching for high " 0.023
 Weight of z in c(z,") 0.5
CV If Fixed cost of vertical integration 1.6
g(z) Firm sizedistribution see Fig. 2
A Working disutility 0.68
Figure 2: Density g(z) and cost function c(z; )
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The values for ; T and CV If are chosen so as to t the size distribution of rms
as well as share of vertically integrated rms (8 to 9% of vertically integrated rms).
I normalize the nal good price to one, p = 1; and assume a value for the input price
ps = 1:16 consistent with empirical evidence (the model generates a similar average
mark-up for nal good producers of 17.6%)14 Given these prices, the level for the
sunk entry costs Cde and C
s
e were endogenously pinned down by the entry conditions.
Finally, the parameter A is chosen to produce an employment to population ratio
equal to 0:6 as in Hopenhyan and Rogerson (1993).
Table 3 shows the calibration results. It can be seen that the size distribution
of rms, the share of vertically integrated rms, and the employment to population
14Hall (1993), De Loecker et al (2009), Corchon and Moreno (2010), and Moreno and Rodriguez (2010)
estimate a markup of 16%.
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ratio are well tted. Figure 3 documents the rm size distribution in the model and
in the US data.
Table 3: Data moments and model moments.
Data Model
Size distribution of rms % %
1-9 78.61 82.16
10-19 10.68 11.13
20-99 8.88 4.55
100-499 1.52 1.76
500-999 0.15 0.27
1000-4999 0.13 0.10
5000+ 0.03 0.03
Share of vertically integrated rms 8-9 8.62
Employment to population ratio 60 63
* Source: Census Bureau 2008
Figure 3. Density of rm sizes:
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Figure 4 documents the equilibrium size distribution of rms together with the
size distribution of vertically integrated and not vertically integrated rms. The line
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with squares represents the total size distribution of rms, while the other two lines
represent, for each size, the proportion of each type of rm (vertically integrated and
not vertically integrated) to the total share of rms for each particular size (this is,
the area below each line adds up to the share of each category in the total number
of rms). The line with circles represents the size distribution of entrants.
Figure 4. Density of rm sizes.
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Figure 5 presents the cumulative fraction of rms. The line with squares rep-
resents the total size distribution of rms in the model and the circles represent the
one corresponding to the data. The lines with triangles and stars correspond to the
cumulative distribution of not vertically integrated and vertically integrated incum-
bent rms in equilibrium. Notice that the size distribution of vertically integrated
rms dominates (in rst order stochastic dominance sense) to the size distribution
of not vertically integrated ones as in Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009).
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Figure 5. Size distribution of all rms, vertically integrated
and not vertically integrated rms.
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3.3.2 The e¤ect of size-dependent policies
The model economy presented above, gives rise to rich rm behavior as manufacturer
enter, exit, and decide how to obtain their inputs. In this environment an industrial
structure emerges as the result of optimal investment decisions. In this framework,
regulations that restrict the size of establishments a¤ect rmsincentives to use their
optimal vertical structure and have an impact on protability, size distribution of
rms and average productivity. In this section we use the model to analyze how
size-dependent policies a¤ect TFP by changes in the optimal vertical structure of
rms.
I introduce positive idiosyncratic distortions to employment and production, n
and  y respectively. In order to do so, in the benchmark economy (without distor-
tions) I rst nd the idiosyncratic productivity level for which the rm size is the
mean, bz, and then tax all rms with idiosyncratic productivity levels above bz. Table
4 documents the results for distortions in employment, n, of 5%, 10%, and 15%
and compares the results with the rst column that correspond to the benchmark
economy.
Focusing on the economics of the model, the results indicate that distortions on
employment act as a subsidy to low productivity rms and as a barrier to verti-
cal integration (penalizing high productivity rms). Regarding the manufacturers
with high productivity, for the ones that prefer to use specialized inputs, vertical
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integration becomes less attractive and they increase the demand for standardized
inputs. For manufacturers with high productivity that prefer to use standardized
inputs, the tax on employment gives incentives to reduce their size. For the mid-
sized rms, since no distortions are imposed to them, as it is explained later on,
both the increase in the nal good price as well as the decrease in the standardized
input price (that resembles a subsidy), induce them to expand. The same happens
to rms that are smaller than the mid-sized rms.
Formally, the distortion on employment reduces manufacturers expected value
at entry. In order to restore the free entry condition, the nal good price must
increase. Since the mean demand for standardized inputs (m) increases suppliers
expected value at entry increases (upon entry suppliers sell more inputs increasing
protability). In order to restore the free entry condition for suppliers the standard-
ized input price must decrease. As a result there are two e¤ects on the mean rm
size. First, since P increases and Ps declines, and as no distortions are imposed to
small rms, small rms expand. Second, as explained before, big rms contract and
the fraction of vertically integrated rms declines. As the second e¤ect dominates
the mean size of rms decreases.
Through this mechanism, distortions on employment have a nontrivial e¤ect on
the size distribution of rms. Figure 6 shows that the density of mid-sized rms
increases. There is a reallocation of resources (employment) from big rms to small
rms.
Table 5 shows the size distribution of rms by vertical structure. It can be noticed
that there is a decline in the fraction of mid-sized rms that vertically integrate.
Furthermore, there is a shift to the right of the size distribution of not vertically
integrated rms, while the size distribution of vertically integrated rms shifts to
the left.
There are two e¤ects on TFP. First, employment is shifted from high to low pro-
ductivity rms. Second, distortions on employment strongly penalize to vertically
integrated rms (the most e¢ cient rms), thus manufacturers that continue oper-
ating under vertical integration reduce their size, and fewer manufacturers become
vertically integrated. As a result, there is a decline in total factor productivity.15
15See the appendix for denitions of total factor productivity.
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Table 4: Comparative Statics on n.
n n
Tax 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 5% 10% 15%
Size dist.
of rms
1-9 82.16 75.85 69.55 63.26 P 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.09
10-19 11.13 11.69 12.21 18.26 m 6.08 7.88 9.79 11.67
20-99 4.55 10.72 16.55 17.47 Ps 1.16 1.12 1.10 1.08
100-499 1.76 1.45 1.42 0.85 Mean size 100.0 98.6 98.8 99.0
500-999 0.27 0.16 0.18 0.06 NVI 100.0 129.4 160.8 191.8
1000-4999 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 VI 100.0 94.4 90.3 86.5
5000+ 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 TFP 100.0 98.7 98.0 97.6
Exit rate 10 10 10 10
% VI rms 8.6 8.2 7.7 7.1
Note: m is the mean standardized inputs demand.
Table 5: Comparative Statics on n.
Tax 0% 5% 10% 15%
Size distribution of rms NVI VI NVI VI NVI VI NVI VI
1-9 86 0 79 0 72 0 66 0
10-19 12 0 12 0 13 0 19 0
20-99 2 57 8 64 15 65 15 77
100-499 0 35 0 30 0 29 0 19
500-999 0 6 0 4 0 3 0 1
1000-4999 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
5000+ 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
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Figure 6. Size distribution of all rms and n.
The introduction of distortions in production,  y; is very important because it
helps to understand further how the model works. It shows the new insights the
mechanism in the current paper provides. Furthermore, it shows a key result that
highlights how an economy reacts to di¤erent sources of distortions.
Table 6 documents the results for distortions in production,  y, of 5%, 10%, and
15%, related to the benchmark economy. By comparing the results with the previous
exercise, it can be noticed that distortions on production have a bigger impact on
prices P and Ps than distortions on employment.16. Formally, the elasticity of the
expected value at entry for both manufacturers and suppliers with respect to distor-
tions in production,  y, is higher than with respect to distortions on employment,
n. Through the e¤ects on price, as it is explained later on, distortions in production
have the potential to do much more damage (the misallocation is higher) as it is
reected by an increase in the mean size of rms and a bigger decline in TFP.
Formally, under the same reasoning as before, as  y increases the expected value
at entry decreases. To restore the free entry condition of manufacturers the price of
the nal good increases (see Table 6). As vertical integration decreases and rms
demand more standardized inputs, the mean demand for inputs increases and the
input price decreases (so as to restore the free entry condition for suppliers). As
a result there are two e¤ects on the mean rm size. First, as no distortions are
16The magnitude of the subsidy mid-sized rms receive (by means of prices) is bigger.
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imposed to small rms, the increase in nal good price and the decline in the input
price induce small rms to expand. Second, big rms contract and the fraction
of vertically integrated rms declines. In contrast with the case of distortions on
employment, for the case of distortions on production the rst e¤ect dominates and
thus the mean size of rm increases.
Regarding the e¤ects of  y on the size distribution of rms Figure 7 shows a bigger
increase in the density of mid-sized rms compared to the case when n increases.
There is a reallocation of resources (employment) from big rms to small rms.
Table 7 indicates that rms that do not become vertically integrated increase their
size, while vertically integrated rms reduce their size (there is a shift to the right
of the size distribution of not vertically integrated rms, while the size distribution
of vertically integrated rms change in the opposite direction). The fraction vertical
integration among mid-sized rm decreases. Firms with low productivity expand
more with  y than they do with n, and thus the misallocation is more important.
In contrast with the case in which n is positive, there is an increase in the mean
size of rms and thus a bigger decline in total factor productivity.
Table 6: Comparative Statics on  y.
 y  y
Tax 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 5% 10% 15%
Size dist.
of rms
1-9 82.16 69.62 632.3 52.75 P 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.12
10-19 11.13 17.78 18.25 22.73 Mean m 6.08 8.65 11.57 14.21
20-99 4.55 10.87 16.70 23.50 Ps 1.16 1.11 1.08 1.07
100-499 1.76 1.45 1.44 0.86 Mean size 100.0 103.2 106.9 110.7
500-999 0.27 0.16 0.18 0.06 NVI 100.0 141.9 190.0 233.5
1000-4999 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 VI 100.0 96.0 92.0 88.1
5000+ 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 TFP 100.0 98.3 97.4 97.1
Exit rate 10 10 10 10
% VI rms 8.6 7.9 7.1 7.0
Note: m is the mean standardized inputs demand.
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Table 7: Comparative Statics on  y.
Tax 0% 5% 10% 15%
Size distribution of rms NVI VI NVI VI NVI VI NVI VI
1-9 86 0 73 0 66 0 55 0
10-19 12 0 19 0 19 0 24 0
20-99 2 57 9 62 15 68 21 78
100-499 0 35 0 31 0 25 0 19
500-999 0 6 0 3 0 5 0 1
1000-4999 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
5000+ 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Figure 7. Size distribution of all rms and  y.
3.4 Conclusion
In the current paper I have developed a dynamic model of an industry with het-
erogeneous rms interacting as buyers and sellers of inputs, endogenous vertical
integration, and market frictions to study how size-dependent policies interact with
the organization of production that rms optimally choose determining di¤erences in
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the size distribution of rms and TFP across countries. In this context, distortions
on production and employment generates a reallocation of resources (employment)
from big rms to small rms and act as barriers to vertical integration. I nd that
a 15% output tax on rms that are above mean level of productivity generates a
decline in the fraction of vertically integrated rms from 8.7% to 7%, a decrease
in TFP of 2.9%, and an increase of 11% in the mean size of rms. A 15% tax on
employment generates a decline in the fraction of vertically integrated rms from
8.6% to 7.1%, a decrease in TFP of 2.4% and a decline of 1.2% in the mean size of
rms.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Solution Method
The algorithm to compute the equilibrium is as follows:
1) Take initial guesses for the price of the nal good, p0; for the input price, p0s,
and for the suppliers acquisition price P V I0.
2) Take an initial guess for the density of productivity of manufacturers looking
for a standardized suppliers J0(z; ),
3) Obtain policy functions n(z;  ; ); m(z; ); x0(z;  ; "); nV I(z;  ; "); mV I(z;  ; ")
and value functions ; V (z;  ; "); V V I(z;  ; "); W (z;  ; ").
4) Compute the price for P V I0(z; ") =
P
"
P
z
P

W (z;  ; "; p; ps)J(z; )g
s(").
5) Use the computed decision rules to compute the invariant density of productiv-
ity of manufacturers looking for a standardized suppliers J(z; ), and compare
it with J0(z; ) :
i) If they are not close)guess a new one (J0(z; ) = J(z; )) and repeat
from point (3) until they get close.
ii) If they are close)stop and go to next point .
6) Compute Ve(p; ps) and We(p; ps) and given the entry costs Cde and C
s
e verify if
free entry conditions (equations 7 and 8) hold:
i) If they do not hold:
 If Ve(p; ps) < Cde and/or We(p; ps) < Cse ) guess a new higher prices,
p and ps by bisection and repeat from point (1):
 If Ve(p; ps) > Cde and/or We(p; ps) > Cse ) guess a new lower prices,
p and ps by bisection and repeat from point (1):
ii) If Ve(p; ps)  Ce and We(p; ps)  Cse )stop and go to next point.
7) Use the computed decision rules to compute the xed points of the distribution
of manufacturers when the mass of rms is one (Md = 1). Thus, we have the
xed points b and bV I :
8) Compute the aggregate prots and tax revenue, (p; ps; w; 1; 1) andR(p; ps; 1; 1)
and obtain aggregate labor demand and supply. Use the linear homogeneity
of labor demand and supply to obtain the equilibrium value for Md (given
Md = M s) that satises the labor market clearing condition for the nal good:
Ld(p; ps; w;M
d;M s) = Ls(p; ps; w;(p; ps; w;M
d;M s) +R(p; ps; w;M
d;M s)):
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3.5.2 Total factor productivity
In this section I describe how the total factor productivity is calculated. I dene
TFP as the revenue total factor productivity. It is calculated as follows:
TFP =
X
z
X

X
"
pzn(z;)
(w+ps)n(z;)
e(z;  ; ") +X
z
X

X
"
pznV I(z; ;")

(w c(z;"))nV I(z; ;")+CV If
eV I(z;  ; ")
+
X
z
X

X
"
psn(z;)
wn(z;)
e(z;  ; ")
where the rst term represents the weighted average (the weight is the share of
not vertically integrated manufacturers in each state, e(z;  ; ")) of the ratio of not
vertically integrated manufacturers revenues, pzn(z; ), to their total production
cost, (w + ps) n(z; )+ Cf . The second term is the weighted average of the ratio of
vertically integrated manufacturers revenues to their corresponding total production
costs. In this case eV I(z;  ; ") is the share of vertically integrated manufacturers in
each state (z;  ; "). In contrast with the rst term, in the denominator it appears the
variable cost advantage of specic investments, c(z; ") and xed cost of a vertically
integrated rm, CV If . The last term correspond to the revenue TFP of suppliers.
The function e(z;  ; ") is the share of suppliers matched to a manufacturer of type
(z;  ; ").
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